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Abstract. In the advertising discourse of human genetic database projects, of genetic
ancestry tracing companies, and in popular books on anthropological genetics, what I
refer to as the anthropological gene and genome appear as documents of human history,
by far surpassing the written record and oral history in scope and accuracy as archives
of our past. How did macromolecules become ‘‘documents of human evolutionary
history’’? Historically, molecular anthropology, a term introduced by Emile Zuckerkandl
in 1962 to characterize the study of primate phylogeny and human evolution on the
molecular level, asserted its claim to the privilege of interpretation regarding hominoid,
hominid, and human phylogeny and evolution vis-a`-vis other historical sciences such as
evolutionary biology, physical anthropology, and paleoanthropology. This process will
be discussed on the basis of three key conferences on primate classiﬁcation and evo-
lution that brought together exponents of the respective ﬁelds and that were held in
approximately ten-years intervals between the early 1960s and the 1980s. I show how the
anthropological gene and genome gained their status as the most fundamental, clean,
and direct records of historical information, and how the prioritizing of these epistemic
objects was part of a complex involving the objectivity of numbers, logic, and mathe-
matics, the objectivity of machines and instruments, and the objectivity seen to reside in
the epistemic objects themselves.
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‘‘The parts played by the molecular and the organismic biology
come out with extraordinary clarity when viewed against the
background of the Science of Man.’’1
The Anthropological Gene and Genome
In his bookReﬂections ofOurPast:HowHumanHistory isRevealed inOur
Genes (2003), anthropologist John H. Relethford deﬁnes anthropological
genetics in a typical fashion as the use of genetics to reconstruct the history
of human populations. Anthropological genetics is seen to hold the answer
to such central concerns as who we are and where we come from:
Thinking about ancestry can be extremely frustrating. Most of us
know our most immediate ancestors (our parents), most of whom
knew their parents, and so on into the past.Over long periods of time,
however, this information gets lost, for one reason or the other.
Genetics provides a way of uncovering some of this information.Past
events – from migration of people from one group to another to
changes in population size –mayhave left a record behind in our genes.
Our written and oral histories are incomplete and lack much time
depth, but we carry a genetic signature of past events. In this sense, the
study of genetics in living people can provide clues to past human
history. As we study patterns of genetic variation, we look for such
clues that have been preserved in our genes, generation to generation.
We can (within limits) learn about the past by studying the present.
As noted in the title of this book, genetics provides reﬂections of our
past. This book deals with the search for human history using genetic
data. By looking at the current patterns of genetic diversity in
humans, we can reconstruct the past.2
Relethford ascribes two traits to human genes thatwill be of concern in this
paper:Theycontain informationaboutgenealogy,and they containhistory
in the sense of evolutionary events. He also privileges the genetic infor-
mation over ‘‘other’’ historical records due to the supposed time-depth and
completeness of that information. To approach this understanding of hu-
man nucleotide sequences, I introduce the designations anthropological
gene and genome. The expressions refer to the particularity of genes and
genomes as those of humanorganisms. They also refer to human genes and
genomes as the epistemological objects in the search for answers to
anthropological questions. The anthropological gene and genome are
1 Dobzhansky, 1964, p. 451.
2 Relethford, 2003, p. 9, my emphasis except reﬂections of our past.
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among the objects of molecular anthropology, the study of primate phy-
logeny andhuman evolutionon the basis of genomes andproteins.Howdo
anthropological genes relate to other notions of the gene?
As has been abundantly shown, molecular genetics has undermined
the reductionist conception of the gene as master molecule in the hier-
archy of the central dogma. From the early 1960s, the complexity of
gene transcription became increasingly obvious. This put into question
the understanding of genes as discrete DNA sequences that contain the
information for proteins. The growing knowledge of post-transcription
processes further obscured the locus of information. Such insights from
molecular biology have rendered the view of the genome as a linear
structure ever more problematic. Rather, it appeared as a many-folded
system of hierarchies of structural expression and regulation. This raised
troubling questions: What is the gene? Where does the information for
evolutionary transmission and development reside?
Where the human organism is concerned, the Human Genome Project
was initially hailed as the quest for the Holy Grail. However, it eventually
conﬁrmed that the sequence of the genome in itself is of little information,
that it does not contain life itself. Thus, with the sequencing of the human
genome at the outset of the twenty-ﬁrst century, molecular genetics seems
to have reached the end of the century of the gene. Questions of evolution
and development demand for an analysis of the genome as the entirety of
the cell apparatus of transcription and translation that turns out to be
more and more ﬂexible.3 Indeed, certain voices in molecular biology have
proclaimed a revolution, a paradigm shift from genetics and genomics to
post-genomics (functional genomics and proteomics).4
It therefore seems that the anthropological gene is a retrograde
notion.5 It resembles the classical molecular gene in that it is ontologically
3 For histories of the concept of the gene see for example Keller, 2000; Portin, 1993;
Rheinberger and Mu¨ller-Wille, 26 October 2004.
4 For a critical discussion of the ‘‘proteomic revolution’’ see McNally and Glasner,
2007; note that post-genomics is a double entendre in that it refers to a time after the
genomics paradigm as well as to a research program that focuses also on levels above
the genome in the molecular pathways.
5 In fact, followingFrancisCollins andhis colleaguesof theUSNationalHumanGenome
Research Institute, post-HGPmolecular anthropologymightmore accurately be referred to
as (comparative) human genomics.Defending the genomics-paradigm, the understanding of
evolutionary genomic variation across species andwithin the human species is seen as central
contribution of genomics to the future of biology, while understanding the relationships
between genomics, race and ethnicity, and the consequences of this understanding, would be
part of the genomics contribution to society. Ruth McNally and Peter Glasner, 2007, pp.
258–265, observe that this vision of the future of genomics goes along with a continuation of
the kinds of genetic determinism characteristic of twentieth-century molecular genetics.
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prioritized and in the sense that its bare sequence appears as the carrier of
complex information. However, such perceptions of the gene have also
survived in other areas. The idea that genes are responsible for our body,
group and individual identity, central behavioral patterns, intelligence,
and emotions remains pervasive.6 In fact, the persistence of the ‘‘genes
for’’ notion is not restricted to ‘‘the media,’’ ‘‘funding rhetoric,’’ or ‘‘the
popularization of science.’’ The concept of the sequence of nucleic acids as
locus of discrete information retains its potency also for scientists.7
The inventor of the term gene, Wilhelm Johannsen (1857–1927),
provided a prospective answer to the seeming paradox of the prevalence
of the classical (molecular) gene notion: ‘‘The ‘gene’ is nothing but a
very applicable little word, easily combined with others, and hence it
may be useful as an expression for the ‘unit-factors’, ‘elements’ or
‘allelomorphs’ in the gametes, demonstrated by modern Mendelian
researches.’’8 The gene may be nothing but a little word, but even a
hundred years after Johannsen’s acute observation, it remains of
applicable, of epistemological value in some areas.9 It also remains of
political value.10 In the following, I will explore how this applies for
molecular anthropology, where it is indeed the variation in the very
succession of nucleotides in DNA sections that is informative. The
genome as sequence of nucleotides also carries great symbolic meaning.
The anthropological gene and genome played a political role in the
formation of molecular anthropology vis-a`-vis more traditional
anthropological ﬁelds. The anthropological gene and genome were and
are claimed as the locus of the most fundamental information for the
establishment of our place in primate systematics.
However, the kind of information the anthropological gene and
genome are supposed to carry is special in that it can be of a narrative
nature. The anthropological gene is then understood as a record of past
events. It is therefore performed in the semantic ﬁeld of historical
reconstruction. In the quotation from Relethford above, the insights
from molecular anthropology are presented as a seamless extension of
the individual’s family history into the deeper past and ﬁnally to the
6 For a history of genetic determinism in the context of the history of (molecular)
genetics see Keller, 1992.
7 Stotz, et al., 2004, found in their empirical study that the classical molecular notion
of the gene as a stretch of DNA (sequence) that codes for a polypeptide chain continues
to be central in biology.
8 Johannsen, 1911, p. 132.
9 On the epistemic value of the classical gene notion see Waters, 2004.
10 Michael Dietrich, 2000, argues that the problem of the gene persists not because of
its epistemic value but because of its political value in struggles over scientiﬁc authority.
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evolutionary history of humankind at large. Genes take over where oral
history and written records break down. I shall return to this contem-
porary phenomenon. Before doing so, I aim at an understanding of how
the anthropological gene became the most authoritative level for phy-
logenetic reconstruction and a document of human history in the ﬁrst
place. For an illumination of this process, the negotiations over the
privilege of interpretation regarding hominoid, hominid, and human
evolution prove particularly revealing. I therefore provide an analysis of
instantiations of these negotiations between molecular anthropology,
evolutionary biology, and physical anthropology and paleoanthropol-
ogy. The anthropological gene and genome therein emerge as part of a
rhetorical complex involving the objectivity of numbers, logic, and
mathematics, the objectivity of machines and instruments, and the
objectivity seen to reside in the epistemic objects themselves.
In what follows, I thus reconstruct an episodic history of molecular
anthropology in contact with other approaches to anthropological ques-
tions through three key conferences on primate classiﬁcation and evolu-
tion. These platforms of encounter will serve to analyze how the
assumption of a natural phylogeny preserved in DNA and proteins was
negotiated, and how these molecules became inscribed with evolutionary
history. The ﬁrst event took place in 1962, when the very term molecular
anthropology was coined. As the term suggests, molecular anthropology
does not predate the molecularization of biology driven by the application
ofphysical andchemicalmethodsand instruments in the1950sand1960s.11
At the time of the conference, technologies for protein sequencing had only
recently become available, and the genetic code had just begun to be
‘‘deciphered.’’12 That the establishment of primate classiﬁcations and
11 According to Edward Yoxen, 1982, molecular biology arose from a complex of
factors: a new conception of life reduced to the molecular level that was reductionist and
informational, having its beginnings in genetics (theoretical population genetics); a boom
in the experimental physical sciences afterWWI and increasingly during and afterWWII;
a reorganization of science funding during this period, with the Rockefeller Foundation
(and later the NSF) funding new areas of life sciences research that ﬁt the criteria of the
hard sciences; the new post-WWII media such as television that allowed to broadcast the
molecular approach to the secrets of life. Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger, 1995, p. 2, emphasizes
the importance of new technologies of visualization in the study of organisms and the use
of new model organisms (for detailed histories of molecular biology see de Chadarevian,
2002; Judson, 1996 (1979); Kay, 1993, 2000; Olby, 1994 (1974)).
12 The English biochemist Frederick Sanger (b. 1918) succeeded in protein sequencing
in the late 1940s, and in DNA sequencing in the 1960s, developing improved techniques
in the 1970s. The American biochemist Marshall Nirenberg (b. 1927) and the German
biochemist Heinrich Matthaei (b. 1929) ‘‘deciphered’’ the ﬁrst codon in 1961, and within
ﬁve years the basics of the genetic code were revealed (Judson, 1992, pp. 52–54, 59–60).
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phylogenies initially built on protein analyses was therefore due to the state
of the technological art rather than theprioritizationofproteins over genes.
To the contrary; as thediscussionof the conferencewill show, fromthe start
the idea that the closer to the gene the more reliable was the analysis,
characterized the molecular approaches. Some of the early molecular
anthropologists viewed the nucleotide sequences of genes as the key to the
natural order of the primates. Least ‘‘contaminated’’ by higher order
interaction and environmental ‘‘distortion,’’ they appeared tobe the carrier
of evolutionary history in the raw.
Already in 1962, primate classiﬁcations and phylogenies arrived at
through the comparison of macromolecules challenged those based on
fossil remains and recent organisms. However, the main incentive for
the 1962 conference had been to arrive at a better integration of
anthropology into the evolutionary synthesis. A reform of primate
classiﬁcation and phylogeny under the new systematics was still under
way. It appears that at the conference under concern, the awareness of
the organismic population geneticists present was raised to the threat
molecular anthropology posited to this endeavor. While they advocated
a populational approach to the fossil record, others introduced the
possibility of the superiority of macromolecules over morphological
characters for phylogenetic analysis. The arguments made in favor of
‘‘the gene’’ are among those still current: The molecules involved in
DNA replication and protein synthesis span the entire living kingdom;
the nucleotide sequence of the gene is discrete; the number of nucleo-
tides in a gene is large; nucleotides are quantitatively comparable across
genes; it is possible to estimate dates of divergence for groups without a
fossil record; and ﬁnally, gene sequences are immediate records of
heritable changes.13
This kind of reasoning was well underway by 1975, the year of my
second horizontal section. This conference again brought together dif-
ferent approaches to primate classiﬁcation and evolution. However,
molecular anthropology was at the center of interests, and some of its
results demanded a radical reconceptualization of primate phylogeny.
One argument for priority of these results over the analysis of fossils
was the claim that traditional physical anthropology and paleoanthro-
pology were subjective and ideology-ridden. In contrast, molecular
anthropology was seen as characterized by rigorous mathematical logic
and technology-driven quantitative approaches. The supposed value-
neutrality and objectivity of molecular anthropology were also
13 See for example Fitch, 1982, p. 1135.
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associated with the fundamental nature of the anthropological gene and
genome itself. Correspondingly, the techniques that promised the most
direct approach to the most basic level of analysis had gained the
highest authority among the molecular methods. Amino acid sequenc-
ing dominated, and even the unmediated study of DNA had come into
reach. This meant direct access to the molecule that documented our
evolutionary history. The prospect was linked to the hope that molecular
anthropology would be able to tackle intra-human phylogeny. At the
same time, troubling uncertainties remained, and in particular the
molecular clock hypothesis was discussed controversially. Of particular
interest in the context of this paper is the unstated paradox that emerged
when the notion of molecular clocks was combined with the neutral theory
of molecular evolution. The anthropological gene and genome ﬁgured as
stochastic clock for measuring the lapse of time since the separation of
lineages. At the same time, it was inscribed with historical meaning.
The advent of recombinant DNA technologies in the 1970s made
possible the isolation, cloning and detailed analysis of speciﬁc DNA
sequences. Indeed, the new technologies and new objects such as
mitochondrial DNA eventually did make it feasible to approach such
recent diversiﬁcation events as those within Homo sapiens. The third
conference discussed documents this very moment at the root of the
proliferation of intra-human ‘‘family trees.’’ At the 1987 conference,
modern human origins and dispersal were the main concern. Around
these questions, new alliances were formed between the diﬀerent
approaches. The evolutionary narratives that emerged were supported
by diverse evidence, molecular and other. Although a look at the
molecular studies presented at this conference will bring us much closer
to Relethford’s notion of anthropological genetics as providing reﬂec-
tions of our past, it will also become clear that the stories read from the
DNA had been previously available.
In the time following this conference, the innovation and marketing
of laboratory inventory, such as PCR technology (1987), rendered the
comparative analyses of DNA sequences less money and time
consuming. The gaining of ground of molecular systematics manifested
itself in the establishment of laboratories at such strongholds of tradi-
tion as the leading museums (Smithsonian Institution, the American
Museum of Natural History, the British Museum, the Field Museum,
and natural history museums in Stockholm, Munich, and Madrid).
Obviously, museums were the places where specimens abounded for
molecular analysis by means of DNA sequencers, oligonucleotide
synthesizers, PCR ampliﬁcation machines, ultracentrifuges, and
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spectrophotometers. But also the dream expressed at the 1987 confer-
ence of tapping the information stored in the gene pools of living hu-
mans ‘‘with a battery of population speciﬁc polymorphisms’’ had come
true. By then, the anthropological gene and genome had long been
charged with authority and inscribed with evolutionary history.
Proteins as Cleaner Material for Phyletic Investigations
than Morphological Characters: The Burg Wartenstein
Symposium of 1962
In 1962, the Austrian-born American biologist Emile Zuckerkandl
(b. 1922) introduced the term molecular anthropology to characterize the
study of primate phylogeny and human evolution through the genetic
information contained in proteins and polynucleotides. The same year,
his cooperation with the American physical chemist Linus Pauling
(1901–94) at the California Institute of Technology resulted in a paper
on the relative similarities of hemoglobin amino acid sequences in
humans, the gorilla, the horse, and ﬁsh.14 They laid the basis of the
hypothesis later subsumed under the expression molecular evolutionary
clock.15 It assumed that proteins, like organisms, evolve, and that two
groups of organisms that at one point shared a common ancestor would
at that point also have shared a molecular makeup. After separation, an
ancestral molecule would have evolved independently in the two lines of
decent while maintaining structural homologies. Zuckerkandl and
Pauling arrived at a rate of evolution from the horse–human alpha-
chain diﬀerences and the estimated geological age of their common
ancestor. They further supposed that amino acid substitutions in the
hemoglobin chains that were not eliminated by natural selection
ﬂuctuated around this mean also in other species. On this basis, they
came up with a date of divergence for the human and gorilla lines of
about eleven million years. This estimate was at the lower end of the
then current ones by paleontologists, the higher end of which was about
35 million years.
The occasion at which the term molecular anthropology was coined
was the Burg Wartenstein symposium of 1962. Both Michael Dietrich
and Gregory Morgan have identiﬁed this event as an important
14 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1962, particularly pp. 198–206. Gregory Morgan, 1998,
has shown how Pauling’s concern about the threat of nuclear fallout to humans
motivated his research in molecular biology and led to the conceptual link between
molecular disease and molecular evolution as evidenced in this paper.
15 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965a, p. 148.
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platform of negotiation between evolutionary biology and molecular
evolution.16 It is the starting point of my analysis, because of its focus
on human classiﬁcation and evolution. The experimental practices
thus named can be traced back to the immunological studies of the
American-British bacteriologist George H. Nuttall (1862–1937) in the
early twentieth century.17 However, this Burg Wartenstein symposium
and the one in 1975 on progress in molecular anthropology indicated
some consolidation of the molecular approaches to anthropological
questions. Burg Wartenstein in Austria had been refurnished as a
conference center for the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropologi-
cal Research of New York, worldwide the only foundation solely for
anthropology (inaugurated in 1951 out of Viking Fund Inc. from 1941).
The castle had been damaged during WWII, and bought for Axel L.
Wenner-Gren (1881–1961) in 1957. It had been Wenner-Gren’s inten-
tion to create a center for scientiﬁc activities on an international and
interdisciplinary basis: ‘‘Conferences and symposia are to be projected
whenever possible and practicable on interdisciplinary problems where
anthropology could act as the integrating factor.’’18
The internationality of the 1962-symposium on classiﬁcation and
human evolution was modest, with the United States and Great Britain
taking the lead, followed by Switzerland, and with the addition of Louis
Leakey (1903–72) from Kenya. It nonetheless seems that nothing could
have ﬁt Wenner-Gren’s wish better than the layout of this conference
with its multiple approaches to anthropological issues. Indeed, the sci-
entiﬁc motivation for the conference had been the perception that
anthropology had only insuﬃciently been brought under the paradigm
of the evolutionary synthesis. The attempt to remedy this situation had
started two years earlier at a meeting of the American Institute of
Human Paleontology, which had been followed by another meeting at
the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and a symposium at the American
Anthropological Association meetings in Philadelphia in 1961. How-
ever, despite these premises, the conference turned out to be less inte-
grative than expected.
Central ﬁgure in the endeavor to integrate anthropology and
synthetic evolutionary biology was Sherwood L. Washburn (1911–2002),
who organized the Burg Wartenstein conference and edited the
16 Dietrich, 1998, pp. 91–95; Morgan, 1998, pp. 174–175.
17 Nuttall, 1904.
18 In Haury, 1963, p. 90; on the Burg Wartenstein program see also ‘‘Toward Dis-
covery by Communication: The New Conference Center at Burg Wartenstein,’’ 1960.
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conference volume.19 Washburn pioneered the new physical anthropol-
ogy as a combination of functional, behavioral, and populational ap-
proaches to human biocultural history.20 Variation within populations
instead of typological classiﬁcation was seen as central for an under-
standing of the processes of evolutionary change. Theory, and experi-
mentally veriﬁable hypothesis, set the analytical framework.
Measurements were only one among many techniques applied to par-
ticular problems, to which the molecular approach would be added in the
1960s. In 1958, Washburn had accepted the position of a professor of
anthropology at the University of California, Berkeley, where he took on
the role as the most important scientist for the institutionalization and
canonization of post-WWII physical anthropology in the United States.21
In accordance with Washburn’s program, the Burg Wartenstein
symposium he organized in 1962 was dominated by the architects of the
evolutionary synthesis. Correspondingly, the resulting volume was
framed by George Gaylord Simpson’s opening chapter (1902–84;
then Harvard University) and the two closing ones by Ernst Mayr
(1904–2005; then Harvard University) and Theodosius Dobzhansky
(1900–75; then Rockefeller Institute). As Simpson made clear at the
outset, the main concern was to bring order into hominid classiﬁcation:
‘‘It is notorious that hominid nomenclature, particularly, has become
chaotic.’’22 The sharp comment was aimed at physical anthropology
that had not followed the taxonomic practices from zoology but created
far too many taxa for the few fossils found. This was to be remedied by
the populational approach. With an understanding of populations as
polytypic, the family Hominidae could be simpliﬁed to two genera,
Australopithecus and Homo. Simpson also found fault with physical
anthropology for having generated too many taxa within Hominoidea.
Rather, he accepted what he called the Dryopithecine complex as the
pool from which both the line leading to chimp and gorilla and that
leading to humans had emerged. This subsumed fossils from the
Miocene and Pliocene of Africa, Europe, and Asia, such as Dryopi-
thecus, Ramapithecus, and Kenyapithecus (Figure 1).
As the structure of the conference volume Classiﬁcation and Human
Evolution (1963) suggests, the three chapters on molecular anthropology
19 Washburn had already organized and published the Burg Wartenstein conference
on the social life of early man in 1959, which had included primate ﬁeld studies as well as
papers on human evolution (Washburn, 1961, 1963).
20 Washburn, 1951, 1952.
21 Haraway, 1988, pp. 216–227; Spencer, 1982; Washburn, 1983.
22 Simpson, 1963, p. 5.
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were part of what needed to be framed within the larger paradigm.
Simpson regarded studies of serum proteins and chromosomes as
helpful in the clariﬁcation of the classiﬁcation conundrum. He for
example took them as the basis for lumping the gorilla and the chim-
panzee into one genus. However, he qualiﬁed their results with respect
to humans. Even granting that biochemically humans and chimpanzees
might be very similar, humans were morphologically and adaptively
radically diﬀerent from apes (Figure 2). Accordingly, Simpson main-
tained an early separation of the hominid and anthropoid lines and the
taxonomic diﬀerence of African apes and humans on the family level.
To this belief he appropriated the molecular results of Zuckerhandl and
Morris Goodman (b. 1925):
Seemingly contradictory evidence (e.g. that of the haemoglobins as
reported by Zuckerkandl in this book) indicates merely that in
certain characters Homo and its allies retain ancestral resemblances
Figure 1. Phylogeny of the Hominidea, showing the family Hominidae (comprising the
genus Homo and Australopithecus) and the subfamily Ponginae (of the family Pongidae,
and comprising the genus Pan and Pongo) to have arisen from the Dryopithecus com-
plex, with Ramapithecus and Kenyapithecus situated already towards the hominid line
(the younger Ramapithecus had been dated to 14 million years); from Simpson, George
Gaylord 1963. ‘‘The Meaning of Taxonomic Statements.’’ In Classiﬁcation and Human
Evolution, edited by Washburn, Sherwood L. Chicago: Aldine, p. 27, Figure 6. Viking
Fund Publications in Anthropology No. 37, New York, NY, by permission of the
Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc., New York, NY.
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and that these are not the characters involved in their otherwise
radical divergence – a common and indeed universal phenomenon
of evolution.23
Even before the careful reader, who peruses the volume from front to
back, actually meets with the papers by Zuckerkandl and Goodman,
Simpson devalues their results by his claim that macromolecules were
simply not the right objects on which to base phylogenies.
The results presented by the biochemist Goodman (Wayne State
University School of Medicine, Detroit, Michigan) in his contribution
to the conference volume were those of his pioneering experimentation
on the immunoreactivity of albumin among primates.24 Like Simpson,
Goodman felt that physical anthropology and paleontology lacked
objectivity. He did not see the solution in a more rigorous theoretical
approach to taxonomy, however. Rather, he appealed to an objectivity
Figure 2. Dendrogram of aﬃnities of recent hominoids relative to their radiation into
adaptive-structural-functional zones; the horizontal distance between two taxa among
other things indicates behavioral distance (grade), and the vertical distance of two
taxa from their point of separation indicates time of lineage split (clade) – for Simp-
son, both had to be taken into account for classiﬁcation; from Simpson, George
Gaylord 1963. ‘‘The Meaning of Taxonomic Statements.’’ In Classiﬁcation and
Human Evolution, edited by Washburn, Sherwood L. Chicago: Aldine, p. 26,
Figure 5. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology No. 37, New York, NY, by
permission of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Inc., New
York, NY.
23 Simpson, 1963, p. 25.
24 Goodman, 1960, 1962; Goodman, et al., 1960.
MARIANNE SOMMER484
that seemed to reside inside new technologies and the gene itself. He
drew on recent research in protein chemistry and genetics that showed
that there was a close correspondence between the structural speciﬁcity
of proteins and the code of information in genetic material. This
rendered the comparison of proteins promising for systematics: ‘‘Hence
by utilizing some of the newer biochemical and serological methods for
studying the structural speciﬁcity of proteins it is possible to ascertain
the genetical aﬃnities of contemporary organisms with a reasonable
degree of objectivity.’’25
Goodman had studied serum proteins of primates by two-
dimensional starch-gel electrophoresis and agar gel precipitin meth-
od. The results suggested that the chimpanzee and the gorilla were
the closest human relatives (possibly in this order), followed by the
orangutan, and ﬁnally the gibbon. This was congruent with received
wisdom from morphology. However, the molecular similarity be-
tween humans and African apes led Goodman to propose a new
taxonomy with revolutionary potential. He moved the chimpanzee
and the gorilla to the family Hominidae, with only the orangutan
left to represent the Pongidae. He thus opposed Simpson. His tax-
onomy made it clear that classiﬁcation should reﬂect (molecular and
morphological) similarity and divergence time (i.e. clade), but that it
should not incorporate ‘‘less rigorous’’ criteria such as rate of
structural-functional evolution due to entering new adaptive niches
(i.e. grade) (Figure 3).
This new systematics provoked skepticism towards the technologies
of molecular anthropology rather than a rethinking of taxonomy. Even
though Goodman did not question established phylogenies in the more
radical aspect of times of divergence. Rather, to account for the little
diﬀerences on the molecular level between African apes and humans,
Goodman assumed a slowdown of protein evolution in the course of
anagenetic progress. He saw the complexity of higher organisms as the
result of more integrated informational contents of genome sections. As
complexity had increased in the course of evolution, the possibility of
proteins to vary in their speciﬁcity within the species had decreased.
Therefore, in the beginning of phylogenesis, many changes could have
been accumulated in proteins, whereas with evolutionary progress,
molecular evolution would have slowed down. Furthermore, once the
placental sage was reached, gestation time increased with grades, which
heightened constraints on protein variability due to the necessity for
mother–infant immunological compatibility. There thus seemed to exist
25 Goodman, 1963, p. 205.
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paradoxical selective pressures on any anagenetically advancing species,
favoring both, molecular conservatism for inward stability and heter-
ozygosity for outward adaptability.
Goodman saw the solution in the fact that proteins remained stable
over considerable diﬀerences in primary structure (they maintained their
folding and function). Additionally, he thought that the prenatal
molecular makeup was kept conservative, but that more ﬂexibility was
allowed after birth. As a consequence, human albumin, which was
synthesized early in fetal life, showed little variance to the chimpanzee
and the gorilla proteins. On the other hand, other blood proteins such as
globulin were synthesized postnatally and therefore showed greater
diﬀerences between the living Hominoidea. This theory accounted for
the lack of agreement between blood protein studies. It also opened up a
space for reconciling the minimal molecular diﬀerences between the
African apes and humans with the impression of great morphological
diﬀerences. It was amenable to the assumption of long independent
evolutionary lines, and, as in the case of Simpson, to a taxonomic
separation on the level of the family.
Goodman’s conclusion of a close evolutionary relationship between
humans, the chimpanzee, and the gorilla gained support from mor-
phological comparisons of chromosomes, which showed the closest
Figure 3. Morris Goodman’s classiﬁcation based on serological reactions (two-dimen-
sional starch gel electrophoresis and agar gel precipitin technique); from Goodman,
Morris 1963. ‘‘Man’s Place in the Phylogeny of the Primates as Reﬂected in Serum
Proteins.’’ In Classiﬁcation and Human Evolution, edited by Washburn, Sherwood L.
Chicago: Aldine, p. 230, Figure 5. Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology No. 37,
New York, NY, by permission of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological
Research, Inc., New York, NY.
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similarity to be between Homo and Pan.26 However, the real challenge
to existing phylogenies came from Zuckerkandl’s paper (then at
Caltech). Zuckerkandl showed more conﬁdence in molecules when it
came to the question of whether the results from the new technologies of
molecular anthropology or from the traditional morphological
approaches should provide the framework for hominoid phylogeny:
‘‘There are, however, in living matter two types of compounds that are
far more informative than any other characters, namely certain kinds of
nucleic acids and their products, the proteins. These are the speciﬁc
constituents just mentioned of which morphological characteristics are
an overall expression.’’27
Zuckerkandl discussed the three major ways in which these most
informative characters could be analyzed. The method applied by
Goodman of comparing homologous proteins by immunological tech-
niques was the most powerful in that it was fast. Protein amino acids
could also be sequenced.28 Or so-called ﬁngerprinting could be carried
out.29 Zuckerkandl had been involved in ﬁngerprinting for hemoglobin
to compare humans and the great apes. The patterns for human,
chimpanzee, and gorilla hemoglobin had turned out indistinguishable.
Only the orangutan hemoglobin provided a slightly diﬀerent pattern.30
However, Zuckerkandl favored full amino acid sequencing of proteins,
for which a combination of the available methods was necessary. Pro-
tein sequence analysis provided ‘‘[…] the most precise and least
ambiguous insights into evolutionary relationships and into some of the
fundamental mechanisms of evolution.’’31 The method would only be
trumped by genetic sequencing that was not yet technically available. In
Zuckerkandl’s line of reasoning, an analysis of the structural gene,
understood as that segment of DNA that contained the information for
one polypeptide chain, would be the most informative.
The sequencing of proteins as gene proxies looked at point mutations
that had been ﬁxated in the genome. Zuckerkandl considered this kind
of change the most commonly retained in structural genes and in pro-
teins during evolution (rather than terminal growth, splitting, losing or
26 Klinger et al., 1963.
27 Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 243.
28 This was done by X-ray diﬀraction, or stepwise chemical degradation, or break-
down by a wide array of proteolytic enzymes, and comparison of the pieces.
29 This consisted in the application of a highly speciﬁc proteolytic enzyme to a protein
and two-dimensional spreading of the resulting fragments over a piece of ﬁlter-paper by
a combination of electrophoresis and chromatography to obtain a speciﬁc pattern.
30 Zuckerkandl, et al., 1960.
31 Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 244.
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gaining sequences and duplication). However, the protein was slightly
less authentic than DNA because the genetic code reduced the possi-
bilities for a point mutation in DNA to result in an amino acid sub-
stitution.32 New genes/proteins, on the other hand, were most likely to
arise through duplication.33 Zuckerkandl agreed with Goodman that
ﬁxations of point mutations occurred at diﬀerent frequencies in diﬀerent
areas of DNA, due to physico-chemical properties, to diﬀerential
selective pressure, to variable length, and to mutation tolerance. Even
within one protein, areas would diﬀer in their tolerance to change.
There might be (nearly) indiﬀerent substitutions that were selectively
neutral. Substitutions in regions that altered the interchain and inter-
molecular relations would be less frequent. However, because these did
not have an all-or-nothing eﬀect with regard to function, they would be
more likely than mutations in areas essential for the protein’s function
as a whole. The latter kind of mutation would be ﬁxated with the least
frequency. It was nonetheless possible, as exempliﬁed by the sickle cell
condition, which was a point mutation that changed the functionality,
but was retained because otherwise selectively positive.
The variation in mutation rates between protein regions, between
non-homologous proteins, and between homologous proteins in dif-
ferent lineages was a paramount problem with regard to the molecular
approach to anthropology and evolution. It was therefore a point dis-
cussed by a restricted committee that besides the molecular specialists
included Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Simpson. The discussion on the pros
and cons of the molecular approach was later continued in the Burg
Wartenstein plenum. We know that this happened, and can guess what
the events might have been like, because Zuckerkandl took the argu-
ments up in his contribution to the conference volume. Unfortunately,
he does not always indicate which position was taken by which
participant.
One consequence of the rate problem was the question of how
quantity should be translated into degrees of similarity/diﬀerence
between organisms. Should the number of diﬀerences in amino acids
between proteins in diﬀerent lineages be related to the maximum amino
acid changes a polypeptide may tolerate before losing its functionality,
or to the number of amino acids it contained? Furthermore, back or
repeated mutation at one site did not leave traces, a problem increased
for phylogenetically more distant taxa. Unrelated to the problem of
32 Zuckerkandl here drew on Nirenberg and Matthaei, 1962.
33 By translocation and subjection to another regulator gene for example (Jacob and
Monod, 1961).
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interpreting molecular diﬀerences, but possibly most importantly for
some participants, protein analysis could not determine whether a gene
pool was open or closed. It was therefore diﬃcult to defend its relevance
to an understanding of speciation. Secondly, evolutionary trends would
be visible on the level of organisms only. Evolutionary trends were the
prerogative of fossils, which were the records of historical develop-
ments. The knowledge available on the molecular level seemed therefore
further limited because of the lack of proteins from fossils, but their
availability was seen as a future possibility.
In conclusion, Zuckerkandl seems to have unmitigatedly reproduced
the synthesists’ stance. Not only was advanced technology needed for
the sequencing of many proteins in many organisms, but for the larger
picture of evolution, these molecular analyses would have to be com-
bined with all other levels of analysis up to human psychology:
[…] when the molecular, supra-molecular, cellular, tissular,
organic, systemic, individual, and further the ecological, sociolog-
ical and psychological levels are considered, it appears that the key
to the determinism of evolutionary trends is found at the higher
levels of integration more than at the lower ones. This appears to
be so because natural selection acts on functional characters and
functions are carried out by coordinated wholes.34
That results from molecular anthropology made sense only in the
context of ‘‘higher-order’’ evidence was certainly true for phylogenies
that included divergence times. While degrees of similarity could be
elicited in molecular biology laboratories alone, other sources were
necessary for the establishment of distances in time. As we have seen, in
their work on amino acid substitution rates, Zuckerkandl and Pauling
had depended on a date from paleontology to calculate the mutation
rate.35 Zuckerkandl therefore conceded that molecular phylogeny was
merely complementary to non-molecular kinds of evidence at least in
this respect: ‘‘They [sequence comparisons] furnish interesting indica-
tions, but cannot be relied upon in the absence of conﬁrmatory evidence
from a diﬀerent source.’’36
In the consideration of the pros of the new methods for the assess-
ment of degrees of similarity/diﬀerence between organisms, analysis of
primary structure (amino acid sequence), secondary and tertiary struc-
ture (folding and special arrangement), and higher molecular units, such
34 Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 258.
35 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1962.
36 Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 268.
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as formed through interactions among polypeptide chains, had to dif-
ferentiated. One advantage of the primary structure was that in contrast
to morphological traits that varied continuously, changes in amino acid
sequences were discontinuous. The fact that proteins were clearly
bounded also seemed to lessen the danger of a bias with regard to
arbitrary choice of taxonomic characters, once the choice of which
proteins to analyze in the ﬁrst place had been made. However, phy-
logenies based on molecular diﬀerence might be distorted because of
correlations such as the connection of change in one peptide to changes
in others. On the other hand, correlation in the change of morphological
traits may not necessitate correlated structural gene mutations (but only
regulatory change).37 The molecular level was seen as less likely to
misguide interpretations due to polygenic and pleiotropic eﬀects than
the organismal level. Furthermore, while the same phenotype may have
several molecular make-ups, eﬀects of convergence seemed to pose less
of a problem in the investigation of proteins. In these respects, ‘‘[…]
proteins are a ‘cleaner’ material for phyletic investigations than mor-
phological characters.’’38
Overall, and here Zuckerkandl’s own stance seems to come
through, cause and eﬀect relations were assumed to be clearer, the
closer the analysis was to the basic structure of the genome. For those
who held the notion of the gene as ‘‘clean’’ in the sense of ‘‘funda-
mental’’ and ‘‘bare of environmental distortion,’’ protein sequencing
could partially decrease the problems associated with phylogenetic
reconstruction on the morphological level: ‘‘[…] the further away we
get in the series of integrated biological levels from the gene level, the
more disturbance is caused by environmental eﬀects […].’’39 Evidently,
the same characteristics of the molecular level of analysis were
considered to be its disadvantage by some and its advantage by others.
In the ﬁrst case, the organism (and higher levels of integration) was
prioritized as object of analysis because it represented the level of
integration on which natural selection acted. In the second case, the
gene/protein level was prioritized because it was least distorted by
higher-level eﬀects.
37 Dobzhansky and Mayr doubted the existence of these two kinds of genes. They
thought that a structural gene may control the rate of activity of another gene, while
regulatory or controlling genes would at the same time be structural (Zuckerkandl,
1963, p. 264).
38 Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 260.
39 Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 267. This point seems to have found support by G. A.
Harrison (University of Liverpool; on this pros and cons discussion see also Dietrich,
1998, pp. 92–94).
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Although we have no transcripts of the discussions taking place at
Burg Wartenstein on the subject of molecular anthropology, a paper on
which Zuckerkandl and Pauling collaborated in 1963 may provide some
further insights into the stance Zuckerkandl defended. In this, they
thought about ‘‘molecules as documents of evolutionary history:’’ ‘‘We
may ask the questions where in the now living systems the greatest
amount of their past history has survived and how it can be
extracted.’’40 The answer to the ﬁrst question was, in the genes (or in
DNA), in RNA, and in polypeptides. In this order of relevance, the
molecules that carry the information of the genes or a transcript thereof
were called primary, secondary and tertiary semantides. Zuckerkandl
and Pauling deﬁned the genes as the primary semantides in terms of
‘‘linear ‘sense carrying’ units.’’41 In the semantides, ‘‘[…] there is more
history in the making and more history preserved than at any other level
of biological integration.’’42
The history gleaned through comparisons between homologous
polypeptides consisted in information about the approximate time of
existence of a molecular ancestor, its probable amino-acid sequence, and
the lines of descent along which given changes in sequence had occurred.
That there were no ‘‘fossil’’ molecules, as had been bemoaned at Burg
Wartenstein, was thus not necessarily seen as a disadvantage vis-a`-vis
paleoanthropology by Zuckerkandl. The techniques of paleogenetics
allowed to reconstruct paleogenes.43 The hierarchy within the molecular
system was explained on the basis of information drain. DNA was the
most informative semantide because in the passage from primary to sec-
ondary, and from secondary to tertiary semantides, information was lost.
40 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965b, p. 357 (the paper was ﬁrst published in Problems
of Evolutionary and Technical Biochemistry. 1964. Science Press, Academy of the Sci-
ences of the USSR, pp. 54–62).
41 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965b, p. 358. Genes are not clearly diﬀerentiated from
DNA molecules in their deﬁnition of semantides. Rather, the primary semantides are
ﬁrst identiﬁed as the genes, and later more generally as DNA.
42 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965b, p. 360.
43 In a paper with Linus Pauling, Zuckerkandl coined the term chemical paleogenetics
for the restoration of information on paleogenes (‘‘fossil’’ ancestral genes) through the
reconstruction of ancestral amino acid sequences by comparisons of homologous
polypeptides in contemporary organisms. This seems to be the ﬁrst application of what
later would be called the maximum parsimony method. The resulting paleogene, they
envisioned, could eventually provide insights into the ancestral polypeptide’s functions
(Pauling and Zuckerkandl, 1963, p. 15). Today paleogenetics may not only refer to
ancestral gene sequence reconstruction through comparisons of homologous genes in
present organisms, but is also associated with the extraction and analysis of macro-
molecules from fossils.
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Isosemantic heterozygosity referred to diﬀerences in base sequences be-
tween alleles that did not result in diﬀerences in amino acid sequences, so
that ‘‘the ‘sense’ of the ‘word’, in terms of amino acids, may remain the
same.’’44 From gene to protein, information was also lost due to the fact
that signiﬁcant stretches of DNA were not expressed.
This was complicated by the possibility that some base substitutions,
though cryptic at the level of the polypeptide chain, may aﬀect the rate
of polypeptide synthesis through diﬀerential transfer-RNA availability
(secondary crypticity). Other substitutions would be cryptic also at the
level of transfer-RNA (primary crypticity). On the basis of this obser-
vation, Zuckerkandl and Pauling reﬂected on what would later be
conceptualized as neutral evolution at the molecular level:
If isosemantic substitutions recognized by transfer-RNA actually ex-
erted an eﬀect on rate of polypeptide synthesis, one would expect
natural selection to act quite strongly on such substitutions. If natural
selection did not act on the other postulated type of isosemantic sub-
stitutions, those of ‘primary crypticity’, not recognized by transfer
RNA [sic], the occurrence of such substitutions would be random.45
However, Zuckerkandl and Pauling reasoned that natural selection was
more likely to act also in the second case, due to some kind of as yet
unknown phenotypic eﬀect.46 At the same time, the degeneracy of the
genetic code and the loss of information content associated with isose-
mantic substitution supported the notion of DNA as master molecule
over polypeptides, even though the latter were involved in the regulation
of synthesis rates of both kinds of molecules. Furthermore, it is of para-
mount importance that the possibility of primary crypticity opened up a
totally new vista of a level of informationmore basic than that instantiated
44 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965b, p. 361.
45 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965b, p. 365.
46 This is therefore not a proto-neutral theory of molecular evolution. Gregory
Morgan, 1998, discusses how the conception of the molecular clock by Zuckerkandl and
Pauling did not go along with a notion of molecular evolution as mostly neutral, but
that the idea of diﬀerential selection pressures causing diﬀerential resistances to change
along the sequence of a protein was pivotal. They assumed that this resistance to change
at changeable sites would be more or less constant and average out over time, resulting
in a regular ticking of the clock. Due to the role ascribed to natural selection in protein
evolution, Zuckerkandl did not argue for the independence of molecular from organ-
ismal evolution (on the question of ‘‘neutral mutations’’ see also below; on the devel-
opment of Zuckerkandl’s ideas concerning the importance of selection at the molecular
level and the correlation of levels of evolution see also Zuckerkandl, 1987, and the
interview between Gregory Morgan and Emile and Jane Zuckerkandl from 11 July
1996, at http://www.sfc.fr/material/hrst.mit.edu/groups/evolution/index.html).
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at any level of the phenotype. That meant beyond the realization of an
organism in the sense of the totality of polypeptide chains that were
actually synthesized and the structures that controlled this synthesis. It
meant beyond even the potentiality of an organism in the sense of the
polypeptides that could be synthesized at certain rates under certain
conditions. There, a glimpse was caught of a time tunnel: ‘‘This part of its
‘being’, necessarily cryptic in terms of the phenotype, would at best be
expressed only in relation to the evolution of the species.’’47 Diﬀerences in
allelic sequenceswith no consequences on any higher level of the organism
remained feasible, and Zuckerkandl and Pauling perceived their unique
potential as ‘‘documents of evolutionary history.’’ Nucleic acid substi-
tutions of primary crypticity would represent an unmediated ‘‘record’’ of
evolutionary change, completely undistorted by environmental eﬀects.
Lily Kay has described the role of cybernetics and information the-
ory in the transfer of information and communication discourse to
living systems that took place in molecular biology in the time following
WWII. This was complicated by the diﬀerent information concepts
involved. Whereas information theory worked with the 0-1-information
content concept, biologists thought of information in terms of
meaning.48 The latter understanding of information is evidenced in
Zuckerkandl’s and Pauling’s paper. They conceptualized the gene as
master molecule in the sense of a linear sequence of nucleotides that was
the most fundamental repository and communicator of phenotypic
information (see italicized terms above). However, for Zuckerkandl and
Pauling the genetic semantide might carry at least in its primary-cryptic
nucleotides a kind of information that did not relate to the phenotype,
but was of a purely evolutionary, and, as they called it, historical nature.
As the ensuing discussion of the second Burg Wartenstein symposium
will bring to light, the direct accessibility of this evolutionary ‘‘history’’
stored in the genes through new technologies marked a turn in the
relationship between molecular and organismal anthropology.49
47 Zuckerkandl and Pauling, 1965b, p. 366.
48 Kay, 1994, 2000, Chaps. 3 and 4.
49 Independently from my writing of this article, Edna Sua´rez has composed a paper,
in which ‘‘Molecules as Documents of Evolutionary History’’ ﬁgures centrally. She, too,
is interested in its situatedness in the debates between molecular and organismal ap-
proaches to evolution, and perceives of the kind of language used by Zuckerkandl as of
epistemic as well as of political value. Most importantly, she focuses on the epistemic
and political dimensions of the metaphor of information, and the shift it undergoes in
the paper by Zuckerkandl and Pauling towards a substitute for ‘‘history’’ (Sua´rez,
2007). However, Sua´rez does not link the claim for the prime epistemic value of the
primary semantide to the notion of primary crypticity.
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Washburn later remembered that despite the disputes over classiﬁ-
cation between paleoanthropologists and evolutionary biologists, the
main conﬂict at the 1962-Burg Wartenstein Symposium arose between
those who stressed the importance of molecular anthropology (such as
Goodman and Zuckerkandl) and the more traditional views of a
Simpson and Mayr.50 Furthermore, Michael Dietrich has located the
cause for the subsequent attacks on the molecular approach undertaken
by Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Simpson in this very meeting.51 One may
therefore suspect that the architects of the synthesis experienced a cer-
tain awakening at the conference to the potential threats the molecular
approach could present to their project of an evolutionary synthesis in
which anthropology was a centerpiece. As expressed in the quote from
Dobzhansky that I use as a motto for this article, the diﬀerences be-
tween the potentially reductionist molecular and the more holist
organismic approaches became particularly visible once they converged
on questions related to man. Humankind occupied a special place in the
synthesists’ evolutionism, which as we will see was cause for attack by
some molecular anthropologists. Because implicated in discussions
about humankind’s place in nature, the anthropological gene and gen-
ome, too, carried meaning beyond those of ‘‘other animals.’’52
Again, it may well be that molecular and organismal biologists
agreed about many conditions, but not about their conclusions. In
retrospect, the synthesists’ arguments for the irreducibility of evolution
and phylogeny to the molecular level gain an ironic turn. Among these
were: Natural selection takes place on the level of the phenotype; the
eﬀect of selection becomes more diﬀuse rather than clearer as one
descends the hierarchy to the level of the gene; the further a character
from the genes, the more likely it is to sample a number of genes, and
50 Washburn, 1983, p. 19.
51 Dietrich, 1998, pp. 94–95.
52 On the human exception in the Evolutionary Synthesis see Sommer, forthcoming. I
argue that Dobzhansky, Julian Huxley, Simpson, and to a lesser degree Mayr, intro-
duced an epistemic break into their systems with the emergence of humankind. The
special place of humans in the natural world allowed turning a not directed, only
seemingly teleological kind of evolution into a potentially truly teleological one. Hu-
mans were the centerpiece of these cosmological systems, because in them the cosmos
had become conscious of itself. Out of this consciousness about the evolutionary process
grew the responsibility to become the managers of the future course of evolution.
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therefore to represent aﬃnities of whole organisms.53 It was exactly the
greater independence from selection that might disturb the record of
phylogeny, the less entangled cause and eﬀect relations, and the relative
simplicity, discontinuity, and particularity of genetic characters that
were used in favor of the molecular approach and that could be enlisted
as arguments for the ideas of regularity and neutrality of evolution at
the molecular level.
Furthermore, the above arguments may not only be seen as inadver-
tently helping prepare the way for the neutral theory of evolution at the
molecular level.54 Simpson for one also imbued the notion of DNA as
carrier of evolutionary history with authority, even while he attempted to
turn the entire semantic ﬁeld of the master molecule on its head. Mim-
icking the information discourse of molecular biology, he argued that the
DNA was message as well as communicator, but not author of the mes-
sage. It composed only mutations, and these were mostly deleterious.
Rather, the message stored in the DNA and transferred in hierarchical
feedbacks to higher levels was the result of natural selection working on
phenotypic variation (based on genotypic variation) in a particular
environment. Thus, natural selection orchestrated all integrative levels
53 For reactions of the synthesists who were present at Burg Wartenstein in 1962
against ‘‘the glamour’’ of molecular biology as a scientiﬁc discipline and against its
approach see for example Dobzhansky, 1964, 1966; Mayr, 1963a; Simpson, 1964,
1966a, 1966b, where he again made the argument that since we are obviously very
diﬀerent from a bacterium, our molecular similarity only suggests that molecules are the
wrong level of comparison, and Simpson, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, Chaps. 1–2; on re-
sponses to the rise of molecular biology, in particular by biochemists, see Abir-Am,
1992.
54 On the basis of the probable rate of evolution in terms of the entire genome, the
Japanese geneticist Motoo Kimura, 1968, concluded that most nucleotide substitutions
must be selectively (nearly) neutral. Otherwise, the mutation rate would be too high to
be sustained by a mammalian population. The assumption of selectively neutral genetic
change was associated with an increase in the importance of chance factors also for the
evolution of non-founder, that is average-size, populations (genetic drift) (on the
development of the neutral theory and its role as the ﬁrst general theory of molecular
evolution see Dietrich, 1994; see Schwartz and Maresca, 2006, for a critical discussion of
the history of and current research in molecular systematics and the notion of molecular
clocks). Edna Sua´rez and Ana Barahona, 1996, argue that Kimura was not solely
inﬂuenced by the population geneticist discussion of the classical versus balanced
hypotheses, but that the experimental results from molecular evolution (such as high
rates of evolutionary change at the molecular level) were important for his ﬁrst for-
mulation of the neutral theory of molecular evolution. Furthermore, Kimura later
incorporated empirically grounded assumptions into his theory such as were brought
forward by Jack Lester King and Thomas H. Jukes, 1969, in their own version of non-
Darwinian evolution at the molecular level (such as a molecular clock and the uncou-
pling of the molecular from the organismal level of evolution).
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between the phenotype as entire organism and the genotype. This argu-
ment for the importance of environments, populations, andorganisms for
heredity through natural selection seems to have rendered the notion of
DNA as a message in the sense of evolutionary history less metaphorical:
‘‘Viewed in this way, it [natural selection] is the composer of the genetic
message, andDNA,RNA, enzymes, andothermolecules in the systemare
successively its messenger.’’55 In other words, according to this logic,
natural selection inscribed DNA with organismic history.
Admittedly, from this line of reasoning also followed that the regularity
and neutrality of change in proteins/genes was unlikely. Nonetheless, there
might have been a more eﬀective argument to discredit the notion of genes
as carriers of evolutionary history, and thereby to argue for the greater
importance of phenotypes for evolutionary reconstruction. Simpsonmight
have pointed to the fact that if there was some substance to the idea of an
internal constant-rate mutational process, it was indeed nothing but a
measure of linear time. In fact, he did argue along these lines when
defending organismic or evolutionary biology against molecular biology in
general. He emphasized that in contrast to the biological sciences, the
physical sciences were ahistorical endeavors, and their objects of study
carried no history. Therefore, if molecular biology wanted to be anything
but a contradiction in terms, if it wanted to make statements about the
living world rather than the chemical world, it could not have repeatability
and predictability as central epistemic virtues. Historical sciences had to
dealwithcontingencyand theuniquenessofobjects andevents.56Letme try
55 Simpson, 1964, p. 1538. Note that for Washburn, it was exactly this argument for
the centrality of behavior as ultimately directing the course of (genotypic and pheno-
typic) evolution through the feedback mechanism of natural selection (i.e. adaptation)
that made it possible to embrace the molecular anthropological approaches and results
from the start, some of which he had stimulated (Washburn, 1967). If ‘‘the human gene
pool is the result of the behaviours of past times’’ (p. 25), the analysis of genes might
well provide information far beyond phylogenies and divergence times, and they might
well be seen as at the basis of a more integrative approach to human evolution. The
recent divergence of African apes and humans as established through molecular
anthropology were also less diﬃcult for Washburn to integrate, since he had never
accepted a phylogeny with very old independent lineages, but as early as the 1930s
believed the two had shared a relatively recent brachiating stage.
56 Simpson, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, pp. 9–10, for an elaborated treatment of the topic
see Simpson, 1964 (1963) (on Simpson’s emphasis on paleontology as a historical sci-
ence in his self-assertion vis-a`-vis molecular biology see Aronson, 2002); Mayr at-
tempted a similar diﬀerentiation with his distinction between functional sciences that are
concerned with proximate causes, such as functional anatomy and molecular biology,
and sciences concerned with ultimate causes, or questions of how something came about
historically, such as evolutionary biology (see for example Mayr, 1961).
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to apply this argument to anthropology: If the molecular approach could
measure units of time after lineage separation, it was therefore a (nearly)
metrical device, the function of which stood in opposition to the notion of
the gene as a repository of historical events on the population level. Indeed,
the statistical nature of mutations was often analogized to the Poisson
distribution of radioactive decay. As it was, however, the molecular
anthropologists would have the cake and eat it. They would postulate the
independence of molecular from phenotypic evolution on the basis of the
neutral theory of molecular evolution and claim that DNA was the most
important object in historical reconstruction.57
It is unclear in how far such discussions about the contribution or
challenge from molecular anthropology to biological anthropology had
been anticipated for the 1962-Burg Wartenstein symposium. The sym-
posium’s agenda seems rather to have been the rewriting of human
evolution from the theoretical underpinnings of the synthetic theory of
evolution, a notion corroborated by the closing articles by Mayr and
Dobzhansky. Like Simpson at the beginning of the volume, Mayr in his
contribution emphasized the need to reform fossil hominid classiﬁcation
on the basis of population thinking. Also like Simpson, he accepted the
data from molecular anthropology in so far that the African apes were
conﬁrmed to be closer to humans than the orangutan or gibbon. At the
same time, Mayr emphasized the large morphological diﬀerences be-
tween humans and apes. Once again, the adaptive niche of Homo was
considered causal for the diﬀerence in grade. It seemed that the hominid
niche had necessitated a drastic reconstruction of morphology associ-
ated with bipedalism, tool making, and language, but not a complete
revamping of the biochemical system.58 As we will see in the following,
this diﬀerentiation between the two kinds of evolution would eventually
be accepted by molecular anthropologists who used it to turn the
argumentation for the epistemic priority of organisms in phylogenetic
reconstruction on its head.
Also Dobzhansky’s main target was the residue of outdated typo-
logical approaches in both traditional morphology and in the newer
molecular anthropology. But Dobzhansky’s text shows that besides
these approaches to anthropological problems, there was yet another
way of thinking that needed to be fended oﬀ. The population geneticist
Dobzhansky saw his ﬁeld threatened by ideas such as those of the
57 Simpson remained an opponent of molecular anthropology and its theory of a
molecular clock (see for example Simpson, 1981; see also Dobzhansky and Boesiger,
1983, pp. 50–51).
58 In this Mayr, 1963b, also drew on Schultz, 1963b.
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anthropologist Frank Livingstone (b. 1928). Cline theory represented
the other extreme from the typologists with respect to the question of
discrete units at the sub/species level.59 According to Dobzhansky,
organisms in one vertical line of descent formed a continuum. This
meant that the boundaries between groups of organisms that temporally
succeeded each other were arbitrarily produced by superimposing the
discontinuity of the fossil record on natural continuity. To the contrary,
between contemporary organisms there existed real discontinuity.
Contemporary races and species were natural entities, even if popula-
tional rather than typological:
Races, breeds, or subspecies are, on the contrary [to species],
genetically open systems […] Gene diﬀusion between races often
ﬁnds visible expression in geographic character gradients, or clines.
Such gradients may make it diﬃcult or impossible to draw clear
lines of demarcation between the races, especially when the gradi-
ents in diﬀerent characters are uncorrelated. This diﬃculty has been
used by some authors as a basis to argue that man has no races, or
even that races in general do not exist. This is about as logical as it
would be to argue that youth is not diﬀerent from old age because
the gradient between the two is almost completely smooth.60
This is signiﬁcant in our context, because while Dobzhansky empha-
sized development in grades over development in clades (that is gradual
progress without much speciation), he provided the basis on which
molecular anthropology would build in two important respects: Human
races could be meaningfully diﬀerentiated in a populational approach,
and their diﬀerences represented a natural order. Furthermore,
although Dobzhansky, who had made an eﬀort to familiarize himself
with paleoanthropology, did not grant the molecular level epistemic
precedence over morphology, he was working with a conception of
living systems as integrated hierarchical levels, at the basis of which was
the gene: ‘‘Biology is the study of life. The lowest, or most elementary,
or most fundamental living unit is a gene. A gene is a bit of matter, as
far as known always containing, or composed of deoxyribonucleic or
ribonucleic acid. This remarkable substance can engender, in proper
environments, synthesis of copies of itself.’’61 However, he immediately
59 See Livingstone, 1962, which contains a reaction by Dobzhansky.
60 Dobzhansky, 1963, p. 351; on the post-WWII development of population genetics
and its usage of the concept of race see also Gannett, September 2001; Reardon, 2005,
particularly Chap. 2.
61 Dobzhansky, 1963, p. 347.
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qualiﬁed that since scientists simply tended to regard as most basic the
object they themselves studied, one might just as well prioritize the
organism as the most fundamental unit of evolutionary analysis. As we
will see in the next section, this turned out to be more than a ‘‘just as
well’’ discussion.
Genes as Documents of Evolutionary History and the Burg
Wartenstein Symposium of 1975
On the days from 25 July to 1 August 1975, another symposium was
held at Burg Wartenstein that also deﬁned the phyletic position of
Homo sapiens in the order of the primates and the trends at work in
human evolution as its concern. However, the main issue was molecular
anthropology, and the conference title took up Zuckerkandl’s neolo-
gism of the previous conference: ‘‘Progress in Molecular Anthropol-
ogy.’’ The title of the resulting volume combined the two interests to
Molecular Anthropology: Genes and Proteins in the Evolutionary Ascent
of the Primates (1976).62 Rather than a theorist of the new synthetic
anthropology, it was now Goodman and the human geneticist Richard
E. Tashian who edited the volume, assisted by Jeanne H. Tashian (both
of the University of Michigan Medical School). The Wenner-Gren
sponsored meeting brought together experts from protein and nucleo-
tide chemistry, genetics, statistics, paleontology, and physical anthro-
pology, but the balance had changed. In fact, the 1976 volume included
only two papers from classical paleoanthropology. The molecular ap-
proaches comprised primary amino-acid sequencing of hemoglobins,
myoglobins, carbonic anhydrases, and immunoglobulins, as well as
immunological analyses of serum proteins and DNA hybridization.
Finally, diﬀerent mathematical models were discussed as techniques for
statistical interpretation of the comparative molecular data.
At its extremes, the gap had widened, even though the non-molecular
and molecular approaches were not distributed strictly along the lines of
disciplinary training of the participants. Physical anthropologists in the
main maintained the very early divergence of the hominid and pongid
lines on the basis of fossils such as Ramapithecus.63 On the other hand,
some of those working in molecular anthropology had gained trust in
62 Goodman, et al., 1976.
63 Simons, 1976; Walker, 1976.
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the molecules, and began to interpret little molecular diﬀerence as short
separate evolutionary lines.64 Indeed, in a recapitulation of the debates
held and the ﬁndings presented at the conference, Goodman and the
Tashians reported that ‘‘[t]he notion of the intrinsic superiority of
molecular data over data from the fossil record was introduced. Anal-
ysis of the fossil record has apparently been more subjective than
analysis of molecular data, which lends itself better to techniques of
rigorous mathematical logic.’’65
This verdict might astonish in view of the lack of agreement among
those working on molecular evolution and phylogeny. The greatest con-
troversy concerned the feasibility and nature of the molecular clock(s).
The problempersisted that homologous proteins did not seem to evolve at
the same rate in diﬀerent phyletic lines, nor diﬀerent proteins within the
same line. Could one assume a regular clock at all, and if so, was it to be
found in particular proteins or in the entire genome? How should time be
measured – linearly, or in replication cycles or generation times?Whatwas
the mode of mutation ﬁxation and which functional eﬀects, if any, did
mutations have? Should one focus on presumably selectively neutral
molecular traits only?Were themaindiﬀerences between anthropoids and
humans located in the regulatory apparatus of the genome rather than in
structural genes/proteins, and what would that mean for the concept of a
molecular clock? This possibility based on the insight that due to muta-
tions in regulatory gene regions, relatively little variation inproteinsmight
correspond to large morphological diﬀerences. Related questions were:
Did the computer algorithm of maximum parsimony, which could not
take parallel and back mutations into account, work, or was one of the
several alternative methods of molecular tree construction preferable?
Were sequence comparisons generally misleading because the speciﬁcity
64 On the widening of the gap between molecular evolution and non-molecular evo-
lutionary biology, as represented by Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Simpson, and the gaining
of ground by the ﬁrst, see Dietrich, 1998, pp. 95–109; see for example also Uzzell and
Pilbeam, 1971, who discussed the relative merits of morphological and molecular ap-
proaches to primate phylogeny and found the more recent divergence dates arrived at
through the latter less robust. However, Joel Hagen, 1999, in his discussion of the
conﬂict between naturalists and molecular biologists concerning molecular evolution,
warns of simplifying the positions of what was a multifaceted contest (see particularly
pp. 328–329). As we have already seen in the previous section, and as will become more
obvious in the course of this one, the more particular issues of human evolution created
similarly diverse debates, with approaches from classical paleoanthropology, organismic
population genetics, and biochemistry and molecular biology forming neither consen-
taneous groups nor groups strictly deﬁned according to their members’ training.
65 Goodman, et al., 1976, p. 493.
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of species resided in the inter-hierarchical relationships of their organ
systems?66
The case was complex enough for the primates, but some followed
Livingstone in warning of the particularly diﬃcult situation for human
population studies, due to the inﬂuences of parallel evolution, culture,
and interbreeding. The biochemical methods for studying primate and
intra-human phylogenies were essentially the same, but in the latter case
the branches of a cladogram could not be read as representing repro-
ductively isolated groups. As the anthropologist Gabriel Lasker (1912–
2002; Wayne State University School of Medicine) pointed out, such a
cladogram could at best be approximate, since ‘‘the branches in a
phylogenetic tree’’ that represented human variants were in reality
interconnected.67
Despite these uncertainties, there were those among the molecular
anthropologists who left no doubt about the superiority of the molec-
ular method vis-a`-vis morphology, such as the American bio-anthro-
pologist Vincent Sarich (b. 1934). With the New Zealand-born
biochemist Allan Wilson (1934–91), Sarich had been one of the pioneers
in the application of immunological analysis to primates in the 1960s.68
They developed the immunological clock hypothesis on the premise of a
mathematical relationship between ‘‘the immunological distance’’ (de-
gree of cross-reaction) and the time of divergence of any two species.
This presupposed that amino acid sequence changes in serum albumin
had occurred approximately regularly over time in the lineages com-
pared. Sarich and Wilson used the 30-million-years assumption for the
Old World monkeys-apes split from paleontology to set the molecular
clock. Their results indicated that modern humans and African apes had
shared a common ancestor as recently as ﬁve million years ago. This
played havoc with many phylogenies based on fossil evidence
(Figure 4).
The revolutionary work had been carried out at the University of
California, Berkeley, where the prototype of the molecular evolution
laboratory had been set up in 1965 under Wilson, and from where a
diaspora of researchers would spread to laboratories around the world.
Throughout the course of his career, Wilson trained more than 200
graduate students and post-docs. Indeed, a critical number of scientists
, p p p g
66 See for example Gatlin, 1976; Holmquist, 1976; Moore, 1976; Vogel, et al., 1976.
67 Lasker, 1976.
68 Sarich and Wilson, 1967. Sarich and Wilson also applied the immunological
approach to other groups, such as to pinniped phylogeny (see for example Sarich,
1969).
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who worked in empirical molecular evolution in the 1970s and 1980s
have a pedigree that can be traced back to the Wilson laboratory, and
‘‘the family tree’’ that sprouts from there reaches into laboratories
around the world (Figure 5).69 Sarich had been recruited by Washburn
as PhD student for the anthropology department as a consequence of
the 1962-Burg Wartenstein conference, when Washburn wanted a spe-
cialist in what he perceived as the strong methods of molecular
anthropology for the implementation of his new physical anthropology.
Sarich should be trained by and work with Wilson in the newly set-up
laboratory.70 Washburn heralded the new technologies as ﬁnally pro-
viding some scientiﬁc base to claims about human evolution. At a
meeting of the Western Center of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, he would ridicule comparative anatomy as a kind of pseudo-
science that had given rise to just-stories about human evolution:
Manyof the problemsof traditional evolutionary thinking arise from
the fact that comparative anatomy is basically a primitive, nine-
teenth-century science that has not been reorganized, and in my
opinion cannot be reorganized, without ﬁrst accepting molecular
Figure 4. Albumin (units of change), transferrin (units of change) and DNA (units in
dissociation time of hybrids) phylogeny of the Hominoidea based on the molecular
clock; from Sarich, Vincent M., and Cronin, John E. 1976. ‘‘Molecular Systematics
of the Primates.’’ In Molecular Anthropology. Genes and Proteins in the Evolutionary
Ascent of the Primates, edited by Goodman, Morris, Tashian, Richard E. and Tash-
ian, Jeanne H. New York: Plenum, p. 151, Figure 7.  1976 Plenum Press, New
York, reproduced with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media.
69 For the early history of this laboratory see Creager, 1996.
70 Sarich and Miele, 2004, pp. 111–112; Washburn, 1983, p. 21.
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biology and working with a set of bases and problems very diﬀerent
from those the traditional comparative anatomist worked with.71
Condemning the earlier notion of evolution as guided by progress, Wash-
burn drew a progressive picture of the evolution of the human origins
Figure 5. ‘Family tree’ of the Allan Wilson laboratory at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley, for its 25th anniversary; from Gibbons, Ann. 22 February 1991.
‘‘Systematics Goes Molecular.’’ Science, New Series 251 (4996):872–874, on p. 872.
Reprinted with permission from AAAS.
71 Washburn, 1982, p. 39.
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sciences from fossil-free accounts, to nonsense stories, to the synthesis and
the age of molecular biology and dating techniques (accompanied by some
stagnations and atavisms as indicated in the quote above).
Sarich shared his former PhD supervisor’s conﬁdence in the appli-
cation of physical and biochemical methods to questions of anthro-
pology. In the volume Background for Man (1971) that he co-edited with
Berkeley primatologist Phyllis Dolhinow (b. 1933), he repeated the
common argument that the anthropological sciences were peculiar
because the researchers were also the objects of study: Anthropology is
of such immediate relevance to our view of self that anthropological
knowledge is especially prone to bias. Sarich claimed that it was only
with the advent of the objective technologies of chemical and radioac-
tive dating, and later the biochemical approach to reconstructing the
evolutionary relationships of the living primates, that the deeply
ingrained belief in the human exception began to weaken. Through
these technologies the acceptance of the phylogenetic closeness of
human to non-human primates gained ground. Sarich accused tradi-
tional comparative anatomy of the inability to develop methods robust
enough to lead to agreement on the question of primate phylogeny and
times of divergence, even on the basis of the same paleontological data.
However, he saw the feat now achieved in independent molecular studies,
and Sarich therefore felt justiﬁed in demanding priority for their results:
‘‘one no longer has the option of considering a fossil specimen older than
about eight million years a hominid no matter what it looks like.’’72
Clearly, here was a new tenor. It professed neither the conciliatory
tactics of a Goodman, who continued to subordinate his results from
immunological studies to the line-split dates from paleoanthropology,73
nor the careful consideration of evolutionary complexity evidenced by
Zuckerkandl.74 In their paper for the 1976-Burg Wartenstein volume,
Sarich and his Berkeley colleague John Cronin attacked ‘‘[…] the dis-
tortion of anthropoid taxonomy caused by giving man his ‘proper’
rank.’’75 The distortion they perceived in traditional phylogenies con-
sisted in separate taxa for the African-apes group and humans as well as
in their long independent lines of descent. While the data that came out
of the molecular laboratories were ‘‘[…] direct, quantitative, and
objective,’’ arguments for a special treatment of humans within the
72 Sarich, 1971, p. 76.
73 Dene, et al., 1976; Goodman, 1976.
74 Zuckerkandl, 1976.
75 Sarich and Cronin, 1976, p. 166; a point on which Goodman, 1976, p. 340, partly
agreed.
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primate taxonomy, or discussions about the meaning of molecular
diﬀerences ‘‘[…] involve a good deal of advocacy and emotionalism.’’76
By the time of the 1975 conference, Sarich and Cronin could look
back on at least ﬁfteen years of molecular anthropological techniques,
and they knew what they expected of the future:
The documentation of the validity of this claim has only just begun,
of course, and convincing the interested scientiﬁc community of it
remains the most important task of the molecular systematist. As
this is accomplished, we may expect a burgeoning interest in, and
use of, immunological, DNA hybridization, and electrophoretic
techniques to solve problems of evolutionary relationship.77
‘‘This claim’’ reverberates with the assertion made earlier in their
chapter in the conference volume: ‘‘We believe that the potential of
proteins and nucleic acids to provide such cladistic and temporal
information is inherently greater than that of more traditional sources
of comparative data.’’78 The longer passage is also notable because the
technique of sequencing is omitted. Indeed, Sarich and Cronin felt the
need to defend their particular method within molecular anthropology.
There were now four basic techniques: amino/ribonucleic/deoxyribo-
nucleic acid sequencing, electrophoresis, nucleic acid hybridization, and
immunology. Sarich and Cronin were upset about the fact that
sequencing had achieved the status of a holy grail, while the three
indirect approaches were being comparably neglected. Even though
sequencing was still too expensive and time consuming, and seemed
unlikely to be more easily available in the near future. We have met with
the prioritization of direct sequencing already at the precursor confer-
ence. In the 1976 volume, the section of papers on amino acid sequence
data was allocated the largest amount of space. But the protest from
Sarich bears a certain irony. Sarich’s claim for the truth of the molecules
was so strong that he saw fossils as epistemologically subordinate,
partly based on the more direct approach of molecular anthropology.
Now he had to argue against the lure of ‘‘direct evidence.’’79
76 Sarich and Cronin, 1976, p. 164.
77 Sarich and Cronin, 1976, p. 167.
78 Sarich and Cronin, 1976, p. 142.
79 In the 1980s, Sarich would pick up a ﬁght against researchers who had used the
DNA-hybridization technique to arrive at a hominoid phylogeny that diﬀered from the
one he promoted, i.e. that showed a tighter clustering of chimpanzees and humans,
rather than a trichotomy containing both African apes and humans (see Lewin, 1988a,
1988b, on the personal quality of the ﬁghts, and the politics of science it revealed).
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Sarich and Cronin also positioned themselves against Goodman’s
notion that mutation rates were slowing down in higher grades. They
conceded that not all proteins showed the same rate of mutation (or
indeed changed regularly), but argued for the testability of mutation
rates (clocks).80 In cases for which regular mutation rates had been
shown, one should work with these regular rates regardless of their
cause. One should not look for explanations such as Darwinian selec-
tion or random and neutral mutation. Similarly, mutations in regula-
tory genes that were likely to have been involved in sudden major
changes linked to adaptation/speciation should be treated separately.81
However, in the meantime, the molecular clock had found a theoretical
underpinning in the neutral molecular evolution hypothesis. Indeed, by
then Sarich and Wilson argued for the particularity of molecular evo-
lution vis-a`-vis phenotypical evolution. They were seen as determined by
diﬀerent sets of parameters and to proceed at diﬀerent rates. Evolu-
tionary change in structural genes was describable by the concept of an
evolutionary clock and the neutral theory of mutation, complemented
by functional-constraints and dispensability factors. Phenotypic evolu-
tion, on the other hand, was related to other phenomena on the
molecular level such as mutations in regulatory sequences and chro-
mosomal morphology.82
Within such a line of reasoning, Zuckerkandl’s and Pauling’s tenta-
tive argument for a cryptic kind of information in the genes that was
solely related to evolutionary history could gain full force. Furthermore,
by 1975, the prospects of molecular anthropology had taken a great leap
forward in the practical fulﬁllment of Zuckerkandl’s dream of extract-
ing history from the primary semantides. In the conference volume, the
geneticist K. W. Jones (Edinburgh University) presented the results
from satellite DNA cross-hybridization experiments on anthropoid apes
and humans. He introduced a study on the relative distribution of
related satellite DNA in humans and the chimpanzee on the basis of
restriction enzyme fragments through hybridization. Jones approached
the supposedly most basic level of information on the premise that
‘‘[t]he DNA of a species documents its evolutionary history.’’83 Equally
80 Sarich had developed what came to be called the relative rate test, which consisted
in testing the rates of amino acid change in the taxa under consideration against
out-groups. For example, human, baboon, spider monkey, and tarsier albumins were
similarly diﬀerent from those of a loris, a lemur, a dog, or a bear. This indicated that
there had been no slow-down in the change rate in the human line.
81 Sarich and Cronin, 1976.
82 Wilson, et al., 1977; see also Dietrich, 1998, pp. 108–109.
83 Jones, 1976, p. 357.
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importantly, satellite-DNA, which was presumed to be non-coding,
consisted in very short, highly repetitive, and fast evolving nucleotide
sequences. Jones’s research therefore brought to the fore the persistent
interest in human genetic variability. A relatively young kind of human
satellite DNA raised hopes of approaching more recent aspects of
hominid evolution through its study in ‘‘existing racial groups’’ –
another of Sarich’s seminal visions.84
At the second Burg Wartenstein symposium, the prospects of
molecular anthropology continued to seem promising, and the molec-
ular data converged with regard to the primate branching pattern.
Gorilla, Pan, and Homo were conﬁrmed as more closely related to each
other than any of them to Pongo. And several molecular analyses
suggested that Pan and Homo were even more closely related. The
molecular clock hypothesis had gained momentum through accumu-
lating data, theoretical developments, and methods for molecular tree
building. However, it was also considerably complicated and repeatedly
doubted. It was calculated to be only approximate. This could be
explained for example by gene duplication that happened prior to the
divergence of two species, with the result that one compared paralogous
instead of homologous genes. Furthermore, random genetic drift in
small populations could actually accelerate mutation rates. The muta-
tion rate of a gene might also be really accelerated following functional
changes in proteins. Once the new function would have been optimized,
a slowdown in mutation rate might ensue. Apparent deceleration, on
the other hand, could be due to independent mutations that led to the
ﬁxation of the same nucleic acid at a given site.85
For some, including Zuckerkandl, a less than perfect clock was still a
clock. This meant that the diﬀerences in modes between molecular and
morphological evolution were real and needed to be explained. As we
have seen, morphological evolution was correlated with mutations in
controller sections. Correspondingly, ﬁxation of mutations in structural
genes was seen as less functionally constricted, without negating inter-
relations of the two genetic ways of organismal change.86 Therefore,
Zuckerkandl’s belief expressed in the discussions of 1962 that there were
diﬀerent kinds of genes had become substantiated. This involved a more
84 In Jones, 1976, p. 364. On the stabilization of satellite DNA as a phenomenon in
the course of DNA hybridization research see Sua´rez, 2001. In this process, hybrid-
ization, or reassociation, itself returned from being a technological object to being an
epistemic object.
85 See for example Dene, et al., 1976; Fitch and Langley, 1976; Goodman, 1976;
Matsuda, 1976; Romero-Herrera et al., 1976; Tashian et al., 1976.
86 Zuckerkandl, 1976, pp. 435–438.
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complex notion of genes and genomes. At the same time, within coding
regions it brought greater independence of structural anthropological
genes and genome sections from phenotypic evolution and its mecha-
nism of natural selection. Paradoxically, this amounted to the possibility
of a stochastic clock at the molecular level and simultaneously of genetic
areas of crypticity that had been claimed as the most authentic docu-
ments of evolutionary history.
For others the challenges to the clock concept as presented in par-
ticular by the observed slowdown in higher grades of the primates that
had been an issue ten years earlier were more serious, and the inter-
pretation of molecular analyses therefore more dependent on data from
the fossil record:
To have a truly eﬀective genealogical description and classiﬁcation
of the primates, the molecular ﬁndings need to be integrated with
fossil evidence. The latter can provide a time scale, which in turn
can serve as a yardstick for designating the hierarchical level of the
groups to be described in the classiﬁcation.87
To arrive at ‘‘a natural or truly evolutionary system of classiﬁcation,’’ it
was mandatory that primate paleontologists joined with molecular
anthropologists. As is the concern of the next section, both wishes
materialized: Sarich’s for a molecular approach to intra-human evolu-
tionary history and diversity, and Goodman’s for greater synergy
between the molecular and the organismic anthropology. Finally, at the
1975-Burg Wartenstein symposium, Zuckerkandl’s hopes for the future
of molecular anthropology included a follow-up conference to be held in
ten years time, which, too, in a certain way turned out to be prophetic.88
Mitochondrial DNA and the Molecular Revolution in Anthropology
In 1984 plans were made for a conference on ‘‘origins and dispersal of
modern humans’’ that ﬁnally took place in 1987 (22–26 March), even if
this time, Burg Wartenstein was not the host.89 This conference, located
87 Goodman, 1976, p. 340.
88 Zuckerkandl, 1976, p. 443.
89 Three years after the 1975-Burg Wartenstein conference, the chairman of the board
of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research announced the cessa-
tion of the annual conference program at Burg Wartenstein in the form it had existed
since 1958. The castle was sold in 1980, due to inﬂation, the declining value of the dollar,
the rising Austrian economy, and the situation of the Foundation’s endowment
(Wadsworth, 1978).
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in Cambridge and ﬁnanced by British institutions, stood under the aegis
of the archeologist Paul Mellars of the University of Cambridge and the
paleoanthropologist Chris Stringer (b. 1947) of the British Museum of
Natural History in London. As Zuckerkandl had envisioned, the
international conference brought together specialists from human evo-
lution, archeology, and molecular genetics to discuss the revolutionary
developments in molecular biology and their meaning when applied to
human evolution. The papers on the biological subjects were collected in
the volume The Human Revolution (1989).90 Indeed, the 1980s brought a
revolution in more than one respect. In the late 1970s, restriction
enzymes of high speciﬁcity had become available that allowed the
comparison of individual human DNA on the sequence level. These
enzymes cut DNA at precise locations deﬁned by longer sequences, so
that the individual diﬀerences in the resulting fragments were due to
mutations in these restriction sequences. Such variations were therefore
called restriction fragment length polymorphisms (RFLPs).
Thus, as foreshadowed at the 1975-Burg Wartenstein conference, the
turn towards the master molecule coincided with the turn to intra-
human genetic variation.91 The theoretical basis for this interest had
been laid long before. As we have seen, the synthesists regarded human
‘‘races’’ as meaningful biological entities and therefore as epistemolog-
ical objects of population genetics. However, although the interest in
modern human evolution and diversity had never subsided, the tools to
study these directly on the level of DNA had only just begun to appear
on the horizon.92 As we have seen, one such beam of light had been
satellite DNA. What were needed were regions of DNA that showed
high enough mutation rates to function as ‘‘carriers of the very recent
history of human diversiﬁcation.’’ This dream came true with a single,
circular strand of cytoplasmatic DNA. The very year of the Cambridge
conference set a landmark in molecular anthropology thanks to the
fabulous object, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). At least one of the
participants, the geneticist Rebecca Cann, attributed greater authority
to its analysis than either to traditional morphological studies or
molecular studies of nuclear DNA and proteins. Generally speaking,
90 Mellars and Stringer, 1989.
91 This is not to suggest that the techniques of DNA sequencing were not also applied
to the puzzle of hominoid phylogeny, where they actually led to the breakthrough of the
view of a recent Homo-Pan split, with a slightly earlier gorilla divergence, as advocated
by Goodman in the 1960s (see Gibbons, 1990).
92 Research that assessed genetic diﬀerences between human groups indirectly reaches
back to the blood group surveys during WWI, and experienced a ﬁrst high in the 1960s
(Cavalli-Sforza and Edwards, 1967).
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genes of living humans were better suited for the reconstruction of
phylogenies than fossils:
There is no direct evidence that any individual in the fossil record
with a particular phenotype and genotype left genes in modern
descendents, yet geneticists operate with 100% certainty that genes
in modern populations have a history that can be examined and
will trace back in absolute time to real ancestors. This asymmetry
demonstrates the inherent power of genetics to deal with evolu-
tionary issues (27).93
More particularly, mtDNA was the perfect epistemological object for
analyzing modern human evolutionary history and diversity due to
three main virtues: It was relatively simple to analyze; it evolved rapidly,
due to the lack of an eﬃcient repair system; and it was inherited strictly
maternally and therefore was free of the complexities caused by
recombination. The fact that none of these virtues has gone unchal-
lenged need not concern us further. However, Lasker’s warnings in his
opening paper to the 1976-Burg Wartenstein volume about the pitfalls
of molecular phylogenetic studies of human diversity were now more
urgent then ever, when ‘‘[…] in the last few years […] this topic [has]
really taken oﬀ to become (currently) one of the most central and
controversial in the whole ﬁeld of palaeoanthropology.’’94
As the controversial primate phylogeny on the basis of the immu-
nological clock twenty years earlier, the mtDNA news came out of the
Berkeley laboratory (compare Figure 5). MtDNA of approximately 150
people from what were called African, Asian, aboriginal Australian,
Caucasian, and New Guinean populations was sequenced (RFLP
maps). The results of the mtDNA study were published in an article in
Nature that contained a ‘‘human family tree’’ based on mtDNA types.95
This diagram was reproduced in the contribution with which Mark
Stoneking and Cann opened the section on biological change in The
Human Revolution volume.96 Of course, this could only be read as
human family tree if the people, and the geographical groups they were
assigned to, were identiﬁed with ‘‘their mitochondrial DNA.’’ In fact, it
93 Cann, 1988, p. 127.
94 Mellars and Stringer, 1989, p. 1.
95 Cann, et al., 1987. There were several important precursor papers on human
mtDNA analysis. The method was pioneered by Wes Brown, who was brought to
Berkeley by Wilson to continue on his mtDNA technology and results (see for example
Brown, et al., 1979; and Brown, 1980).
96 Stoneking and Cann, 1989.
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was a computer-built diagram of sequence diﬀerences in mtDNA mol-
ecules, based on maximum parsimony and midpoint rooting (Figure 6).
Beyond phylogeny, the results suggested a scenario of human evolu-
tion. They supported the interpretation that all human mtDNA referred
back to a female who had lived in Africa some 200,000 years ago. The
African Eve Theory or Recent African Evolution model that emerged
from these data was a prehistory of human origin, migration, separation,
and struggle reminiscent of the Biblical narrative (and innumerable other
tales of human quest). Modern humans had originated in Africa (that is
modern Homo sapiens evolved from archaic in Africa), from where they
began to migrate some 100,000 to 140,000 years ago to eventually spread
across the globe. In the process, the modern human newcomers com-
pletely replaced archaic Homo sapiens (including Neanderthal) in Asia
and Europe.97 Both, the more speciﬁc results that modern humans arose
in Africa and subsequently populated Eurasia and America, and the
general conclusion that tools for DNA analysis were the key to human
history, were conﬁrmed by further studies presented at the conference. An
analysis of the geographic distribution of human globulin gene cluster
polymorphisms, research on paternal ancestry of modern humans on the
basis of aY chromosome sequence, and apaper onmolecular genetics and
patterns of human evolution told similar stories.98
It is this heroic narrative of human incarnation and conquest of the
globe that constitutes The Human Revolution of the conference volume.
However, it can be understood as referring to either the model of rapid
emergence of modern humans in the course of evolution, or to the
revolution brought about in the sciences of human origins by ‘‘[…] the
fast-developing ﬁeld of what might be termed ‘palaeogenetics’ – his-
torical reconstruction from present-day genetic data.’’99 It indeed seems
that the practices, objects, rhetoric, and the content of the science were
inseparably intertwined. After all, it was in the course of the develop-
ment of molecular approaches to anthropological questions that the
human gene and genome were inscribed with the most reliable traces of
human evolutionary history in the ﬁrst place. Eventually, the ‘‘techno-
logical revolution’’ enabled molecular anthropologists to set the revo-
lutionary story of human becoming free.
97 The association of the African Eve theory with the female line and with an African
origin immediately triggered sexist and racist reactions that purportedly took issue with
the science of the research (Cann, 1997). The storyline has been retold many times since,
and quite often in explicitly Biblical terms (see for example below).
98 Lucotte, 1989; Rouhani, 1989; Wainscoat et al., 1989.
99 Mellars and Stringer, 1989, p. 1.
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Figure 6. ‘Family tree’ of 134 mtDNA types derived from 148 people occupying ﬁve
diﬀerent geographical regions; the tree was constructed by a computer program on
the basis of restriction maps, the parsimony method (minimization of total number of
mutations), and midpoint rooting (hypothetical ancestral sequence located in the mid-
dle of the greatest distance between any two mtDNA types); it suggests that the
greatest mtDNA diversity exists among sub-Saharan Africans, an African origin of
modern humans, and a relatively recent divergence of modern human ‘racial’ groups;
from Stoneking, Mark and Rebecca Cann (1989). ‘‘African Origin of Human Mito-
chondrial DNA.’’ In The Human Revolution. Behavioural and Biological Perspectives
on the Origins of Modern Humans, edited by Mellars, Paul and Stringer, Chris. Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 18, Figure 2.1. Reprinted with permission from
Edinburgh University Press, http://www.eup.ed.ac.uk.
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The revolution in anthropology and the human revolution were part
of new scientiﬁc constellations. In contrast to the Burg Wartenstein
symposiums, where the molecular analyses tended to challenge classi-
ﬁcations and phylogenies by physical anthropologists and evolutionary
biologists, the molecular analyses presented at the Cambridge confer-
ence supported one of two models of modern human origins dominant
in paleoanthropology and prehistoric archeology. Molecular anthro-
pology corroborated the tenets of the out-of-Africa model: Africa had
been the cradle of modern humans, since the molecules suggested a
major African-Eurasian/African divide; modern humans had evolved
relatively recently, as suggested by the molecular clock (regular ﬁxation
of neutral mutations); and human ‘‘racial’’ divergence was an even more
recent phenomenon, since genetic variation within human populations
was shown to be greater than between.100 Proponents of the out-of-
Africa model of modern human origins, among these the editors of The
Human Revolution volume, therefore welcomed molecular anthropology
as an ally against rival theories.
Furthermore, the out-of-Africa model of modern human origins was
part of larger trends in physical anthropology that led to greater conver-
gence with claims about hominoid phylogeny and evolution that had come
out of the molecular biology labs. There were developments in theoretical
orientations (punctuated equilibria hypothesis), methods (cladistics), and
technologies (ESR, TL, U-series dating). These led to critiques of the
hominoid phylogenies with little taxonomic diversity but relatively long
linear lines of descent that had become dominant in anthropology through
its integration into the modern synthesis.101 The new trends emphasized
episodic evolutionary events and cladogenesis. The situation had also
changed due to the discovery of new fossils, and due to the demise of
others as possible oldest known near/hominids. Ramapithecus was by now
seen as closer to the orangutan than to the hominid line.102
100 See for example Rouhani, 1989.
101 See for example Tattersall and Eldredge, 1977; Tattersall, 1995, in particular
Chaps. 12 and 16. On the impact of cladistics on hominid taxonomy and its diﬀerences
to adaptationism see Cartmill, 2001; Delisle, 2001.
102 The discovery of facial remains of the close Ramapithecus-relative, Sivapithecus, in
1979/1980, suggested to paleoanthropologists that the taxa were allied with the
orangutan rather than with hominids (see Lewin, 1984, p. 1182, and Lewin, 1997 (1987),
Chaps. 5 and 6; for a historical overview of developments in hominoid phylogeny and
taxonomy, see Schwartz, 2001; for a discussion of the recent human origins model, its
support from paleoanthropology, archeology, and molecular anthropology, as well its
cultural resonance with positive connotations of multiculturalism see Proctor, 2003).
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However, the results from molecular anthropology remained hotly
debated. No longer did the matter of when the hominid line split from the
anthropoid line(s) take center stage. Instead the question of how far back
in history ‘‘the human races’’ could be traced was controversial. In his
contribution to the conference volume, the anthropologist Milford
Wolpoﬀ (University ofMichigan) pointed at the diﬃculties of the Recent
African Evolution theory. He criticized Cann and her colleagues for
basing their molecular reconstruction of modern human origins on the
assumption of a too high mtDNA divergence rate. Using the same
mutation rate to calculate the point of anthropoid-hominid divergence,
the human and chimpanzee lineages would have split as recently as about
two million years ago, when australopithecines had long since evolved.
Numbers attained on the basis of a lower mutation rate seemed more
likely. These also corresponded with results from DNA hybridization
and estimates from paleontology that ranged between ﬁve and eight
million years for the anthropoid-hominid split.103 As a proponent of the
so-called multiregional evolution scenario, Wolpoﬀ wanted to make the
point that rather than human ‘‘racial’’ divergence being as recent as to
coincide with Homo sapiens, the process had begun earlier, in the after-
math of the supposedly ﬁrst migrations out of Africa byHomo erectus.104
As Wolpoﬀ’s argumentation shows, the proponents of the multire-
gional as well was those of the out-of-Africa model of modern human
origins saw their views supported by the fossil and archeological record
as well as by some of the molecular studies. Both theories might
therefore proﬁt from the aura of objectivity surrounding the technolo-
gies, methods, and objects of molecular anthropology. At the same time,
with questions of modern human origins and evolution taking center
stage, the particularity of the anthropological gene and genome surfaced
with unprecedented force. We have encountered the accusation of a
special treatment of humans against those who maintained a greater
taxonomic and phylogenetic distance between (African) apes and
humans. Now that the controversy focused on the age of human
‘‘racial’’ diversity, the arguments involved mutual accusations of racism.
This was spelled out by Wolpoﬀ in the conference volume:
Finally, both Cann et al. (1987) and Gould (1987, 1988) have
indicated that the Garden of Eden hypothesis [African Eve Theory]
103 In general, although results from molecular anthropology on primate phylogeny
and divergence times were much better received in the anthropological community than
25 years earlier, the controversies around the molecular clocks had far from subsided
(see for example Gibbons, 1995; Lewin, 1985).
104 Wolpoﬀ, 1989.
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should be regarded as an important justiﬁcation for accepting the
reality of ‘the underlying unity of all humans’. This is because the
recent common-ancestry interpretation is said to be a means of
showing that all human beings are closely related. But the contrary
is not true, and the opposing hypothesis about multiregional
human evolution does not support a diﬀerent precept. In fact, quite
the opposite. The interpretation of human evolution as a persistent
shifting pattern of population contacts and shared ideas may
provide an even stronger biological basis for accepting the unit of
all humanity. The spread of humankind and its diﬀerentiation into
distinct geographic groups that persisted through long periods of
time, with evidence of long-lasting contact and cooperation, in
many ways is a more satisfying interpretation of human prehistory
than a scientiﬁc rendering of the story of Cain, based on one
population quickly, and completely, and most likely violently,
replacing all others. This rendering of modern population dis-
persals is a story of ‘making war and not love’, and if true its
implications are not pleasant.105
As evidence from various ﬁelds was brought into convergence in com-
peting accounts of modern human origins, the political fronts in
negotiations over scientiﬁc turf, in which the anthropological gene and
genome functioned as the source of powerful arguments, had changed.
So had the most contested boundaries from those between human and
non-human to those between the human ‘‘races.’’ The diﬀerent histories
‘‘read from’’ the anthropological gene and genome were those already
available in paleoanthropology and prehistoric archeology, and they
had their wider cultural foils. Once again, it was also a question of
which story made for a more ‘‘satisfying’’ kind of history. In this case,
the question revolved around which reading of the traces would suggest
anthropological genes that had recorded origin stories of making love
rather than of making war.
To conclude, in new relationships to paleoanthropology, molecular
anthropology emerged with unprecedented power with respect to
human phylogeny and evolutionary history in the 1980s. The molecular
evidence was stronger than before not least because new technologies,
105 Wolpoﬀ, 1989, p. 98. That the out-of-Africa scenario with a human ‘‘racial’’ history
of less than 50,000 years can nonetheless be combined with the belief in signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between ‘‘the races’’ (morphologically, behaviorally, and mentally, but not
genetically speaking) is exempliﬁed by Sarich and Miele, 2004, particularly Chaps. 7–8.
Sarich and Frank Miele reaﬃrm the notion of a brain size-intelligence link that in their
view establishes a hierarchy from African to White to Asian.
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themselves immersed in a discourse of the objectivity of instruments and
numbers, allowed to ﬁnally access the genes as linear sense carrying
units. In the wake of DNA-hybridization research, DNA sequencing
had extended and sequences were becoming much more widely avail-
able.106 The dream of directly extracting from anthropological genes
and genomes the human history that had long since been inscribed into
the semantides had come true. At the same time, despite new alliances,
technologies, and objects, molecular anthropology had not resolved its
controversies. These continued around the topics of mutation rates, the
selective neutrality of mutations, the best method of molecular com-
parison (genetic distance analysis versus sequencing), and the tree-
building methods (maximum parsimony or alternative method). As in
the past, however, these issues could not dash the hopes put into the
molecular approach:
[…] there are good grounds for thinking that continued research
into the detailed patterns of genetic variability in modern popula-
tions (based, for example, on larger samples, and on more precisely
controlled estimates of genetic mutation rates) will provide a ﬁrm
answer to many if not all of these issues over the course of the next
few years.107
And, ‘‘[i]t seems likely that within a few years it will be possible to study
population migrations with a battery of population speciﬁc polymor-
phisms.’’108
The Anthropological Gene and Genome Revisited
As so many of the optimistic prophecies we have encountered in the
course of this article, the one with which I ended the last section has
come true. This has been helped on by the development and marketing
of automated DNA multiplication (PCR) and automated DNA
sequencing machines in the second half of the 1980s. The entire human
genome has been sequenced in the HGP, and human ‘‘racial’’ variation
and evolution have been studied by a ‘‘battery of population speciﬁc
markers’’ in a number of projects. Finally, successes have been made
106 On the history of DNA hybridization work see Schwartz, 2005, pp. 8–11; Schwartz
and Maresca, 2006, pp. 5–7.
107 Mellars and Stringer, 1989, p. 5.
108 Wainscoat et al., 1989, p. 37.
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with the extraction of DNA from ancient tissues.109 In the process, the
notion of DNA sequences as encoding the secrets of our humanness has
prevailed. So has their position as the key to our individual and group
identity in relation to other individuals and groups today, and in the
context of the evolutionary past.
Why is this so? The episodic history of molecular anthropology as
outlined above suggests that for the extrapolation of phylogenetic
information, the sequences of amino acids (as gene proxies) and of
deoxy/ribonucleic acids have been and have remained of epistemic
value. Rather than at higher levels of organismal complexity, infor-
mation about evolutionary relationships between organisms was and is
seen to reside in sequence diﬀerences, that is at the most basic level of
molecular analysis. The complexity of ‘‘the genome’’ and ‘‘the gene’’ as
already an issue in the 1960s was therefore of concern in molecular
systematics in so far as it was deemed relevant for the history of
sequence structures. This concern surfaced in the debates about the
inﬂuence of natural selection at the sequence level. With notions such as
primary crypticity and the neutral theory of evolution at the molecular
level, this concern was further reduced. Sequences were seen to store
evolutionary history most directly, exactly where they were considered
only loosely related to the phenotype. It is in this sense that they most
accurately documented evolutionary transmission and stochastic
change. Eventually, with the knowledge of the vast amount of non-genic
and non-coding DNA, the gene itself seems to have been lost in a
genomic sea. As the anthropologist Jonathan Marks puts it: ‘‘Genes are
unique in that they happen to be directly responsible of what we observe
as phenotypes, but in their milieu they are just more DNA.’’110
The conception of DNA sequences as the most authentic archives of
phylogeny and evolution was linked to the situation that as newcomers
to a territory already occupied by other scientiﬁc ﬁelds such as paleo-
anthropology and evolutionary biology, those interested in molecular
anthropology emphasized the diﬀerence of their approach. In contrast to
the higher level of establishing phylogeny by morphological compari-
sons of living and fossil organisms, they were looking at the most fun-
damental level of life. The semantides, and in particular DNA sequences,
have been proclaimed as the most basic, direct, and least environmentally
109 These developments largely took oﬀ in the mid-1980s (for an expression of the-
1980s DNA-hype see Lewin, 1984; the Human Genome Project resulted mainly from
initiatives taken in the mid-1980s (see Kevles, 1992); statistical analysis of human ge-
netic variation also became feasible around this time (see for example Reardon, 2001,
p. 360); for early successes in ancient DNA cloning see Pa¨a¨bo, 1985).
110 Marks, 1995, p. 141.
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distorted records of phylogeny and evolution. This led to a paradox,
when an object allegedly free from ontogenetic contam
ination, a near metrical device for the measurement of evolutionary time,
was presented as storing a semantic kind of information. The semantides
as documents of evolutionary history may be viewed as precursors of the
notion of the gene or genome as document of evolutionary history in the
sense used by Jones and Relethford. Molecular data like those generated
by Cann, Stoneking and Wilson are translated into stories that include
historical events such as the time and place of modern human origin(s),
population migrations, encounters, and diﬀerentiation. The idea that
this kind of narrative information could be archived in DNA, however,
seems to contradict the claim of a molecular clock independent from
higher level events that allows translating unit diﬀerences into degrees of
relatedness and phylogenetic divergence times in the ﬁrst place.
The paradox of the anthropological gene, too, is related to molecular
anthropology’s position vis-a`-vis the traditional ways of reconstructing
human phylogeny and evolution. Drawing on the common knowledge
about the historical and cultural shaping of practices and ideas in physical
anthropology, molecular anthropologists at times promoted their
approach as value-free, as driven by logic, mathematics, and technology.
Rather than being subject to the anthropologist’s political stance towards
what it means to be human and towards human diversity, molecular
anthropology was presented as a set of methods and technologies that
simply made visible the natural order of the primates. Put sharply,
according to this view,molecular anthropological studieswere not subject
to translation and interpretation processes. They resembled more the
physical sciences, because they dealt with quantitative comparisons
between sequences inmolecules that could be shown to stand in amore or
less constant relation to linear time.But, in particular in newallianceswith
paleoanthropology and prehistoric archeology, the supposedly value-
neutral and quantitative science became entangled in discussions about
racism with regard to diﬀerent scenarios of modern human evolution.
In the aftermath of the Cambridge conference discussed in the pre-
vious section, even though eventually with qualiﬁed success, the HGP
has continued the rhetoric of our DNA as the constitutive material of
our life as humans: ‘‘There is no more basic or more fundamental
information that could be available.’’111 However, although the dis-
courses around the HGP overlapped with those we met with in
molecular anthropology, the two have to be kept apart. The HGP did
not have as its aim to unravel the genomic diﬀerences between humans
111 Gilbert, 1992, p. 84.
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and other primates or between human groups, but explicitly to con-
struct a universally human genome to tackle medical questions on the
molecular level. In fact, chromosomes of diﬀerent individuals were
morphed into the universal (male) genome. Following its rhetoric, the
HGP was after ‘‘the underlying human structure’’ to ‘‘reﬂect our
common humanity.’’112 Because it was targeted at more complex issues
than DNA sequences (which were merely seen as a tool to higher ends),
the HGP had diﬃculties achieving its promises.
Ironically, the same might not have been true for the Human Gen-
ome Diversity Project, because, as we have seen, molecular systematics
may not be concerned with higher-level phenomena. The HGDP would
have served the aims of molecular anthropology. Conceptualizing
indigenous populations as historical isolates, it aimed at the preserva-
tion of endangered genetic information about phylogeny and evolu-
tionary history. On the basis of the genetic variation collected in gene
banks, scientists should be enabled to reconstruct the history of popu-
lation migrations. Not surprisingly then, the HGDP has been associated
with the epistemological privileging of molecular, particularly genetic,
information, and has been involved in struggles over authority with
other scientiﬁc ﬁelds such as paleoanthropology. It has also been
entangled with historical and current political issues of ‘‘race,’’ racism,
and notions of purity that contradict the premise of the neutrality of the
molecular approach.113
There are several projects that follow in the footsteps of the HGDP,
such as the HapMap, the Genographic, and the African Ancestry
projects, and national genetic projects such as Irish Origins. Some of
these projects couple population genetics with the market for genea-
logical research.114 They ride on the boom of lay genealogical interest
and the authority of genetics with regard to human identity. Companies
advertise DNA analyses as means to unravel family genealogy, mem-
bership in current and prehistoric ethnic or tribal groups, and the place
of one’s DNA in the human family tree at large (for example, Family
Tree DNA (associated with the Genographic Project), DNAPrint
112 Gilbert, 1992, p. 96. The ﬁrst complete human sequence was intended to be a
composite being, having both X and Y, and stemming from DNA of people from the
United States, the European countries, and Japan; it would be a multinational and
multiracial second Adam (see Kevles, 1992, pp. 18–36).
113 Reardon, 2005; the literature on the HGP and the HGDP is considerable, see for
example also Haraway, 1997, pp. 244–254; Kevles and Hood, 1992; Marks, 2001.
114 On the Genographic Project see Nash, 2007; on the African Ancestry project see
Winston and Kittles, 2005; on the Irish Origins project see Nash, 2006; on general issues
related to current population genetical projects see also Marks, 2001, 2005.
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Genomics, Genelex, GeneTree, Orchid Cellmark, Oxford Ancestors,
and Relative GeneticsTM).115 Relethford’s words quoted at the begin-
ning of this paper could appear on the website of many of the U.S.,
Canadian, and British companies that oﬀer genetic ancestry tracing, as
exempliﬁed by the founder and scientiﬁc director of African Ancestry
Inc.: ‘‘Science and technology now provides a bridge to the past.
Technological advances in DNA technology now open up new and
unprecedented opportunities for African Americans to ﬁll centuries old
voids in knowledge of their family history.’’116
Again, DNA technology is presented as providing access to a his-
torical archive that is more complete than oral or written history. As in
the case of Relethford, the comparison often involves a transition from
personal history to the prehistory of humankind without expounding the
associated epistemological problems. We are then no longer considering
the search for parents, grandparents, great grandparents, and so forth,
but for population migrations and interactions, and ﬁnally for the grand
picture of human history, reﬂections of our past. However, as discussed
in this article, the information extracted from DNA sequences is not a
simple completion and extension of family history, nor does it unam-
biguously relate to any other kind of narrative history. African Ancestry
Inc. knows and oﬀers a book with historical and cultural references for
twenty-one African countries with its test kit and products order form.
Narratives need to be inscribed into deoxyribonucleic acid after all.
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